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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2000, a French court decided that a French law banning the 
display of Nazi materials for sale applies to an auction website hosted by 
* Partner, Covington & Burling; J.D., Yale Law School, 1988; Ph.D., Yale University, 
1991; M.A.IB.A., Cambridge University, 199511983; B.A., Williams College, 1981. Some of 
the material in this Article is adapted from Information Technology and Electronic Commerce: 
Law & Practice, of which I am a co-author. Covington & Burling represents technology and 
software industry companies and trade associations in Europe and the United States. In that 
context, my colleagues at the firm and I participated directly as lobbyists and legislative coun-
sel in the policy-making processes that led to passage of many of the pieces of European 
Union (EU) legislation discussed in this Article. Many of the views expressed in this Article 
reflect my experiences as a participant-observer in the EU legislative process. These views are, 
of course, entirely my own. 
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the California-based company Yahoo! Inc. ' The following year, at the 
request of Yahoo! Inc., a U.S. District Court declared that the French 
judgment was unenforceable in the United States because enforcing it 
would violate an important public policy-the First Amendment.2 These 
two cases have attracted considerable attention because they crystallize a 
difficult problem. The Internet is global. Every website potentially 
reaches every home on the planet. Thus, website content or activity that 
may be legal in the country where the website's operator is based may 
reach countries where such content or activity is illegal. Which law or 
laws should apply to the website? Should a website be subject only to 
the laws of the country where the website operator is based? Or should a 
website be forced to comply with the laws of every country where the 
website may be accessible-potentially every country on Earth? In the 
Yahoo! case, the French court concluded that French law applies to a 
website regardless of the domicile of the website operator. While not 
rejecting the French court's analysis of the problem, the U.S. court regis-
tered a caveat, essentially holding that at least some fundamental U.S. 
legal principles should apply to website operators based in the United 
States, regardless of where their websites may be accessible. 
As the other contributions to this symposium suggest, much of the 
debate surrounding the French court's decision and the U.S. court's re-
sponse has centered-not surprisingly-around whether the courts 
reached the correct conclusions, and what the implications of those con-
clusions might be for the future of the Internet.3 Instead of attacking or 
I. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L' Antisemitisme, Interim Court 
Order No. 00105308, 00105309, T.G.!. Paris, May 22, 2000. Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre 
Le Racisme et L' Antisemitisme, Final Order, T.G.!. Paris, Nov. 20, 2000. For a discussion of 
the Yahoo! case, see Mathias Reimann, Introduction: The Yahoo! Case and Conflict of Laws in 
the Cyberage, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 663 (2003). 
2. Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 
1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001). 
3. See Reimann, supra note I, at 669 n.24 (addressing contribution by Professor Jack 
Goldsmith not published in ·this volume); Horatia Muir Watt, Yahoo! Cyber-Collision of Cul-
tures: Who Regulates?, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 673 (2003); Molly S. Van Houweling, 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, the First Amendment, and Internet Speech: Notes for the 
Next Yahoo! v. LICRA, 24 MICH. J. INT'L L. 697 (2003); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo 
and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261 (2002) (defending the French court 
and criticizing the U.S. court); Julien Mailland, Freedom of Speech, the Internet, and the Costs 
of Control: The French Example, 33 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1179 (2001) (criticizing the 
French court). Even before the Yahoo! case, scholars debated whether and to what extent do-
mestic/national laws can or should apply to the Internet. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Federalism in 
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 1095 (1996) (arguing that constitutional principles of federal-
ism limit state authority to regulate the Internet); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and 
Borders-The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (arguing that cyber-
space is separate from real space and should be subject to its own rules instead of national 
regulatory regimes); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199 
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defending the French or the U.S. courts, this Article proposes to focus on 
the Yahoo! case from a different perspective. As is argued in Section 
IILD below, disputes like the Yahoo! case over which country's laws ap-
ply to a website and its operator seem likely to proliferate as Internet 
usage expands, demanding significant enforcement resources from coun-
tries and posing important compliance challenges for companies and 
other organizations operating on the Internet. Thus, it may be useful to 
consider developing an international agreement that would address, and 
in many instances resolve, such disputes about "jurisdiction to pre-
scribe,,4 rules for the Internet. In developing this argument, this Article 
uses as its point of departure a set of rules that already applies to 
France-one of the protagonists in the Yahoo! case. 
As discussed in Part II, the European Union (EO) has adopted a leg-
islative measure, called the E-Commerce Directive,S that contains a rule 
delimiting the jurisdiction of EU Member States to prescribe rules for 
websites the operators of which are established within the EO. Among 
other things, the rule is supposed to ensure that a controversy such as the 
Yahoo! case cannot-or at least should not-arise between two EO 
Member States.6 After a brief discussion of the Directive's legal context, 
Part II examines the Directive's substantive provisions, focusing in par-
ticular on how they might apply to a scenario such as the Yahoo! case. 
Part III argues that the E-Commerce Directive may provide a model for a 
(\ 998) (criticizing the Johnson & Post argument); Lawrence Lessig, The Zones a/Cyberspace, 
48 STAN. L. REV. 1403 (1996) (criticizing the Johnson & Post argument); David G. Post, What 
Larry Doesn't Get: Code, Law, and Liberty in Cyberspace, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (2000) 
(responding to Lessig). The debate about whether and how to impose domestic laws on the 
Internet is now sufficiently mainstream that it has found its way into a standard casebook. See 
LEA BRILMAYER & JACK GOLDSMITH, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES AND MATERIALS 840-57 
(5th ed. 2002). 
4. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 401 (\987) (distinguishing jurisdiction to prescribe from jurisdiction to adjudicate or en-
force). 
5. Council Directive 2000/31IEC of 8 June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Informa-
tion Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 OJ. (L 
178) 1-15 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive). All Member States were required to imple-
ment the E-Commerce Directive by January 17, 2002. The European Commission recently 
sent warning letters threatening legal action against seven Member States, including France, 
that thus far have failed to implement the Directive. See Internal Market: Commission Moves 
Against 13 Member States for Failure to Implement EU Legislation (Jan. 6, 2003), at 
http://europa.eu.intlrapid/startlcgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.getfile=gf&doc=IP/03/410IAGED&lg 
=EN&type=PDF. 
6. Currently, there are fifteen Member States in the EU: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Ten countries are scheduled to join the EU on May 
I, 2004: Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia. 
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broader international agreement delimiting national authority to regulate 
the Internet.7 Interested countries could develop such an agreement under 
the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO), thereby helping to 
establish a "free trade zone" on the Internet and, perhaps, avoid conflicts 
such as that presented by the Yahoo! case. 
II. THE E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE-A EUROPEAN ANSWER TO THE 
QUESTION OF WHO SHOULD REGULATE THE INTERNET 
The E-Commerce Directive is part of a mosaic of legislation that the 
European Communitl (EC) has adopted since the late 1990s, targeting 
online services generally, and e-commerce in particular. To understand 
the E-Commerce Directive, it is important to see how it fits into the leg-
islative context. Most of this legislation is aimed at harmonizing the laws 
of the Member States in particular areas, thereby ensuring that similar 
rules will apply to each online service provider in all fifteen Member 
States.9 As discussed in Section A below, this legislation covers such is-
sues as transparency, e-signatures, copyright, data protection/privacy, and 
value added tax in the online environment. A key purpose of these meas-
ures is to prevent Yahoo!-type cases in which two Member States adopt 
dramatically different rules in a particular area, and force a website op-
erator to comply with both regimes. Absent EC harmonization, each 
website operator might be expected to comply with as many as fifteen 
national laws (twenty-five after enlargement occurs in May 2004)-the 
Yahoo! scenario run amok. The EC also has adopted a regulation that 
7. In a similar vein, Perritt has suggested that the EU provides "the ideal forum in 
which to pioneer ... international initiatives" on such issues as cybercrime and international 
terrorism affecting the Internet. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 41 VILL. L. 
REV. I, 125 (1996). 
8. The EU encompasses what are commonly referred to as three "pillars": 
the European Communities (the European Community, the Coal and Steel Community, and 
Euratom), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Cooperation in Justice and Home 
Affairs. For a brief discussion of the three pillars, see Koen Lenaerts, Federalism: Essential 
Concepts in Evolution-The Case of the European Union, 21 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 746, 751 
(1998). The most elaborate body of law, and the one that is relevant for purposes of this Arti-
cle, has been developed by the European Community (EC). The terms "EC law" and 
"Community law" are used to refer to this body of law. 
9. Under the EC Treaty, the European Community may adopt three types of binding 
measures: "regulations," which have direct effect in the Member States; "directives," which 
must be implemented or transposed by Member State governments in national law; and "deci-
sions," which typically resolve cases or conflicts involving one or more parties. TREATY 
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997 OJ. (C 340) 271 art. 249 (1997) 
[hereinafter EC TREATY]. 
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determines, among other things, which Member State's courts will have
jurisdiction to adjudicate cases arising out of online disputes.
Important though these EC legislative measures may be, however,
they do not reach the broader universe of Member State commercial law
or Member State content regulation. Instead of attempting to harmonize
all areas of Member State law that might affect the Internet, the EC
adopted a rule defining which Member State's laws will apply to a
particular EU-based website operator. As discussed in Section B below,
the E-Commerce Directive declares that a website operator generally is
subject only to the laws of the Member State in which the operator is
established. Thus, with some important exceptions, in a dispute such as
the Yahoo! case, a French court ordinarily would not be allowed to apply
French law to a website based in a Member State other than France. In
certain circumstances, however, when such a website violates an important
French public policy, the French court could activate the E-Commerce
Directive's override mechanism, thereby launching discussions between
French officials and officials of the other Member State about how best to
regulate the allegedly illegal conduct. Application of French law to a
website based outside of France should be a last resort.
A. Legal Context
The legal context of the E-Commerce Directive is the product of
nearly five years of intensive work by the EC legislative institutions-the
European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of
Ministers. The first piece of Internet-related legislation adopted by the
EC was a 1998 amendment to the so-called Transparency Directive.'
Under the amended Transparency Directive, with some exceptions, when
a Member State is preparing to adopt a new law that affects the Internet,
the Member State is required to notify the European Commission and
observe a waiting period before making the new law final." The objec-
tive is to ensure that interested parties have an opportunity to review, and
raise objections to, proposed laws that may affect their interests. The
Directive's effect is entirely prospective. Thus, Member States do not
have to report existing laws, such as the one applied by the French courts
in the Yahoo! case. If a Member State were to consider new content
regulations affecting the Internet, however, it would be required to report
the proposal and face scrutiny from the Commission and other Member
10. Council Directive 98/48/EC of 20 July 1998 Amending Directive 98/34/EC Laying
Down a Procedure for the Provision of Information in the Field of Technical Standards and
Regulations, 1998 O.J. (L 217) 18.
11. Id. at 22-23.
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States. This Article argues below that it would be useful to include a
provision such as the amended Transparency Directive in an interna-
tional agreement addressing Yahoo!-type cases. 2
The EC also harmonized two areas of law--e-signatures and
copyright-where significant differences existed at the Member State level
that might have led to Yahoo/-type disputes over e-commerce services
operating across national borders. The 1999 E-Signatures Directive
harmonized Member State laws governing electronic signatures, 3
requiring Member States to grant such signatures legal effect and
admissibility in evidence. 4 Absent the E-Signatures Directive, one
Member State might have been able to declare invalid an e-signature that
satisfied the laws of another Member State, thereby voiding the "signed"
document. EU officials also were concerned that differences in Member
State copyright laws might lead to a situation in which online copies that
were illegal in one Member State were legal in another. The 2001
Copyright Directive harmonized Member State copyright laws in
certain areas affecting the Internet, and implemented the World
Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty'6 and Performances
and Phonograms Treaty 7 within the EU.'8 As discussed in Section B,
although the E-Commerce Directive generally allows a Member State to
apply its laws only to website operators established within its territory,
an exception allows each Member State to apply its copyright laws to
every illegal copy on the Internet, regardless of the copy's origin.
Data privacy is another field where the EC has adopted special
Internet-related legislation intended to harmonize Member State laws
and avoid conflicts like the Yahoo! case. In 1995, the EC adopted the
Data Protection Directive, which regulates all processing of personally
12. See infra Section III.A.2.
13. Council Directive 1999/93/EC of 13 December 1999 on Electronic Signatures,
1999 O.J. (L 13) 12.
14. Id. art. 5(2), at 15.
15. Council Directive 2001/29/EC of 22 May 2001 on the Harmonization of Certain
Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information Society, art. 2, 2001 O.J. (L 167)
10, modified by Corrigendum to Directive 2001/29/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 6) 70 [hereinafter Copy-
right Directive].
16. World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65 (1997).
17. World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 76 (1997).
18. The Copyright Directive is in many respects similar to the U.S. Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998), with one important
exception. Unlike the DMCA, the Copyright Directive does not limit the liability of Internet
service providers that carry illegal copies of copyrighted materials on their services. For com-
plex political reasons, such liability limitations were inserted in the E-Commerce Directive.
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
I[Vol. 24:719
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identifiable data.19 Although the Data Protection Directive was intended
to establish uniform rules for all sectors of the economy, some
policymakers felt that it did not provide sufficiently robust protection for
personal data collected using then-new digital telephone technologies.
Thus, in 1997 the EC adopted the Telecommunications Data Protection
Directive (TDP Directive), imposing special privacy rules on the
telecommunications sector.'° In mid-2002, the EC updated the TDP
Directive to reflect recent developments in communications technologies,
including the Internet. The resulting Electronic Communications Data
Protection Directive (ECDP Directive)' regulates, among other things, the
confidentiality of electronic communications, collection and use of traffic
data, and unsolicited commercial communications. The E-Commerce
Directive contains a carve-out for EC data protection legislation, including
the ECDP Directive. Thus, in theory, Yahoo!-type disputes might arise
over which Member State's laws apply to a particular website, but in
practice such disputes should not affect the behavior of website operators
because the pertinent national laws should be very similar.
Another subject carved out of the E-Commerce Directive is taxation.
In 2002, the EC adopted a directive that changes the rules for applying
value added tax (VAT) to electronic services (E-VAT Directive).22 Under
the old rules, e-commerce services based in the EU were required to
collect VAT on all transactions with consumers, regardless of whether the
consumer lived in or outside the EU. E-commerce services based outside
the EU were not required to collect VAT from consumers, again
regardless of whether the consumer was in or outside the EU. Because
this situation was believed to place EU service providers at a competitive
disadvantage, the EC revised the rules to require collection of VAT on all
electronic transactions with EU-based consumers, regardless of the
service provider's location. At the same time, EU-based service
providers no longer are required to collect VAT on transactions with
consumers located outside the EU. The E-VAT Directive differs from the
other laws mentioned above in that its primary focus is not eliminating
19. Council Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995
O.J. (L 281) 31 [hereinafter Data Protection Directive].
20. Council and Parliament Directive 97/66/EC of 15 December 1997 Concerning the
Processing of Personal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Telecommunications Sector,
1998 O.J. (L 24) 1, 8.
21. Council Directive 2002/58/EC of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Per-
sonal Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector, 2002 O.J.
(L 201) 37.
22. Council Directive 2002/38/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 128) 41 (amending Sixth VAT Direc-
tive 77/388/EC).
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differences between Member State laws but eliminating perceived
inequities between EU website operators and non-EU website operators.
In effect, however, the E-VAT Directive almost guarantees that Yahoo! -
type disputes will begin to pop up over whether a Member State has the
authority to impose its VAT regime on a website operator based in a non-
EU country, thereby forcing that operator to register with Member State
tax officials, collect VAT, file returns, remit taxes, and so forth.
A final important piece of the legislative context for the E-
Commerce Directive is the Brussels Regulation, which determines what
Member State will have adjudicative jurisdiction over a legal claim in
situations where more than one Member State might have jurisdiction.23
The Brussels Regulation also provides for relatively automatic
recognition and enforcement of judgments throughout the EU.24 The
Brussels Regulation contains special rules for resolving jurisdiction
questions that may arise in cross-border disputes between consumers and
businesses, particularly online businesses.25 If an organization in a
Member State conducts commercial or professional activities in the
consumer's domicile or "by any means, directs" such activities to the
consumer's domicile and the organization enters a contract with the
consumer in the course of those activities, the consumer may sue the
26organization in the courts of his or her domicile. This generally is
referred to as a "country of reception" rule because the consumer's
country "receives" the online "activity" that originated in the seller's
home country. The Brussels Regulation does not apply to disputes
between EU Member States and non-EU countries. Thus, had it been in
effect when the Yahoo! case was filed, it would not have affected the
French court's jurisdiction over the claim. But the Brussels Regulation
would govern such a claim if the plaintiff and defendant were domiciled
23. Council Regulation 44/01 of 22 December 2000 on Jurisdiction and the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 6) 1
[hereinafter Brussels Regulation].
24. Id. arts. 32-56, at 10-12.
25. Id. arts. 15-17, at 6-7. The Brussels Regulation also provides jurisdiction rules for
business-to-business disputes. Businesses enjoy broad authority to specify by contract which
national courts will have jurisdiction over their disputes. Id. art. 23, at 8. In the absence of a
contractual "choice of forum" clause, a business generally has a right to be sued in its home
forum. Id. art. 2(l), at 3.
26. Id. arts. 15(l)(c), 16(1), at 6-7. During the period when the EU institutions were
finalizing the Brussels Regulation, there was considerable debate about the provisions relating
to consumers and whether to alter them. The people who drafted the consumer provisions
intended to resolve questions about jurisdiction over the Internet within the EU, but political
disagreements resulted in language that is less than clear. The key question is what it means to
"direct" an activity to a Member State in the online context where every organization knows,
or should know, that its commercial website is likely to be accessible from every computer in
every Member State. The courts ultimately will have to answer this question.
[Vol. 24:719
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in the EU. In most circumstances, a French court probably would be
allowed to take jurisdiction over an online dispute if a French consumer
were the injured party, regardless of where in the EU the website
operator is domiciled. The French court's judgment probably would be
enforceable in the operator's domicile.
B. The E-Commerce Directive
The E-Commerce Directive, adopted in 2000, was designed to fill
the gaps in this legislative context.27 The Directive consists of several
interlocking parts. As discussed in Subsection 1 below, the heart of the
Directive is the so-called "country of origin" rule, which specifies that an
Internet service generally is subject only to the laws of the Member State
in which the service provider is based. This provision should help
Member States to avoid intra-EU versions of the Yahoo! case. But
Yahoo!-type disputes still may arise in areas that are exempt from the E-
Commerce Directive generally or the "country of origin" rule in
particular. These exemptions are discussed below in Subsection 2.
Moreover, the Directive establishes an override mechanism that defines
situations in which, for "public policy" or other reasons, one Member
State may seek to regulate the conduct of a website operator in another
Member State. As explained in Subsection 3 below, the override
mechanism is designed to channel potential Yahoo! cases into
negotiations between Member State governments. In addition to this
"choice of law" regime, the Directive contains detailed liability
exemptions for Internet service providers28 modeled on those in the U.S.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act.29 The Directive also establishes
(1) disclosure rules for website operators; 3 (2) core e-contracting
principles; 3' and (3) basic rules for online commercial communications.
The Directive contains provisions designed to encourage out-of-court
dispute settlement, and facilitate litigation of claims related to the
27. For brief general discussions of the E-Commerce Directive, see Saul Litvinoff, The
European Union and Electronic Commerce, 62 LA. L. REV. 1221 (2002); Graham Pearce &
Nicholas Platten, Promoting the Information Society: The EU Directive on Electronic Com-
merce, 6 EUR. L.J. 363 (2000).
28. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, arts. 12-15, at 12-13. For more detailed dis-
cussions of the elements of the E-Commerce Directive not related to the "country of origin"
rule, see Pearce & Platten, supra note 27, at 371-74; and the pertinent chapters in INFORMA-
TION TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: LAW & PRACTICE (Mark Plotkin et al. eds.,
forthcoming 2003).
29. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2003).
30. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, art. 5, at 10-11.
31. Id. arts. 9-11, at 11-12.
32. Id. arts. 6-8, at 11.
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Internet.33 The following Sections focus, however, on the "choice of law"
regime and how it might operate when confronted with cases such as
Yahoo!. The final Part of the Article argues that this "choice of law"
regime may provide a model for a broader international agreement
defining the limits of national authority to regulate the Internet.
1. "Country of Origin" Rule
Rather than giving detailed instructions to the Member States on
how to harmonize national laws affecting the Internet, the E-Commerce
Directive establishes a "country of origin" rule, which limits the
authority of Member States to regulate "information society services"
that use the Internet and other electronic networks. An "information
society service" is "any service normally provided for remuneration, at a
distance, by electronic means, and at the individual request of a recipient
of services. 34 Article 3(1) of the Directive requires a Member State to
enforce its laws against an information society service provider
established in that Member State-a system sometimes called "home
country control."35 Moreover, under article 3(2), with important
33. Id. arts. 16-18, at 13-14.
34. See id. art. 2(a), at 8 (cross-referencing Council Directive 98/48/EC of 20 July
1998, supra note 10).
The requirement that an information society service be "for remuneration" should be
construed loosely:
Information society services are not solely restricted to services giving rise to on-
line contracting but also, in so far as they represent an economic activity, extend to
services which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such as those offer-
ing on-line information or commercial communications, or those providing tools
allowing for search, access and retrieval of data; information society services also
include services consisting of the transmission of information via a communication
network, in providing access to a communication network or in hosting information
provided by a recipient of the service ....
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, recital 18, at 3.
35. Id. art. 3(l), at 9. The Directive does not provide rules for determining where an infor-
mation society service provider is established. According to the Directive,
[tihe place at which a service provider is established should be determined in confor-
mity with the case-law of the Court of Justice according to which the concept of
establishment involves the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed estab-
lishment for an indefinite period; this requirement is also fulfilled where a company is
constituted for a given period; the place of establishment of a company providing ser-
vices via an Internet website is not the place at which the technology supporting its
website is located or the place at which its website is accessible but the place where it
pursues its economic activity; in cases where a provider has several places of estab-
lishment it is important to determine from which place of establishment the service
concerned is provided; in cases where it is difficult to determine from which of several
places of establishment a given service is provided, this is the place where the provider
has the centre of his activities relating to this particular service.
[Vol. 24:719
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exceptions discussed below, other Member States are not allowed to
impose their laws on services that the provider makes available in their
territories via the Internet or other electronic networks. Thus, France is
required to enforce its laws against organizations based in France, but is
not allowed to enforce its laws against an organization based in Greece
or Germany that sells products or offers products for sale within France
via the Internet.
The E-Commerce Directive does not refer explicitly to the "country
of origin" rule. Rather, it defines a so-called "coordinated field" and de-
clares that "Member States may not, for reasons falling within the
coordinated field, restrict the freedom to provide information society
services from another Member State."36 With some exceptions discussed
below, the "coordinated field" comprises "requirements laid down in
Member States' legal systems applicable to information society service
providers or information society services, regardless of whether they are
of a general nature or specifically designed for them."37 The coordinated
field includes national provisions related to the "taking up" of an infor-
mation society service, the "quality or content" of the service, and the
"behaviour of the service provider."38 The coordinated field does not in-
clude requirements related to "goods as such," "delivery of goods," or
"services not provided by electronic means."39
If we ignore for a moment the various exceptions and qualifications
as well as the override mechanism (all of which are discussed in
Id. recital 19, at 4.
The Directive also indicates that:
[t]he Court of Justice has consistently held that a Member State retains the right to
take measures against a service provider that is established in another Member State
but directs all or most of his activity to the territory of the first Member State if the
choice of establishment was made with a view to evading the legislation that would
have applied to the provider had he been established on the territory of the first
Member State.
Id. recital 57, at 7.
Absent the case law and oversight authority of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), the
issue of where a particular service provider is established could generate a threshold "choice
of law" problem. If French and German law agree that a service provider is established in
France, then there is no question that French law applies under the E-Commerce Directive.
But if French and German law disagree about where a service provider is established, there
would have to be a preliminary choice about which law applies to the issue of establishment
before the Directive's "country of origin" rule would come into play. The ECJ prevents this
threshold problem from arising by imposing uniform rules regarding establishment across the
EU.
36. Id. art. 3(2), at 9.
37. Id. art. 2(h), at 9.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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Subsections 2 and 3 below), the potential application of the "country of
origin" rule to the scenario in the Yahoo! case is clear. If a website
selling Nazi materials were posted by a company established in a
Member State that does not forbid such sales, the website ought to be
permitted to offer such materials for sale in all fifteen Member States,
including those such as France that forbid display of Nazi materials for
sale. To the extent that a French law forbidding such sales or offers for
sale applies to Internet content, it should fall squarely within the
coordinated field. France would be required to apply the law to websites
operators established in France. But applying the law to a website
originating in another Member State would restrict the freedom of the
website operator to provide an information society service into France
from another Member State, and thereby violate the E-Commerce
Directive. °
As noted above, the coordinated field does not include requirements
related to "goods as such" or "delivery of goods." Could France argue
that a law banning display of Nazi materials for sale relates to goods
(e.g., a hard copy of Mein Kampf), and therefore falls outside the
coordinated field? Probably not. A recital4 ' to the E-Commerce Directive
states that "[i]nformation society services span a wide range of economic
activities which take place on-line; these can, in particular, consist of
selling goods on-line."42 Thus, selling Mein Kampf online should qualify
as an information society service. Another recital specifies the scope of
the authority that Member States retain to regulate "goods as such" and
"deliveries of goods." "[T]he coordinated field ... does not concern
40. A service provider such as Yahoo! Inc., whether based in France or another Member
State, might argue that it is exempt from French law under article 14 of the E-Commerce Di-
rective, which states that a service provider is not liable under certain conditions for
"information" stored "at the request of a recipient of the service." Id. art. 14(1), at 13. The
allegedly exempt "information" would be the online displays of Nazi materials that the third-
party "recipient" of Yahoo!'s services hopes to sell in France. I do not want to digress on the
issue of service provider liability, but I believe the service provider's argument would fail for
at least two reasons. First, a service provider such as Yahoo! Inc. carrying Nazi materials for
sale probably would not qualify for the so-called "hosting" exemption because the service
provider does more than simply host third-party content. The service provider operates an e-
commerce service that sells goods and services for third parties. Second, even if the service
provider qualified for the hosting exemption, it still might be required to take down unlawful
content if it received appropriate notice. Id. Thus, the service provider could not evade appli-
cation of the French law by citing article 14. In the remainder of this Article, I assume for the
sake of simplicity that the EU-based service provider is the actual seller of Nazi materials
rather than an auction site facilitating sales of such materials by third parties.
41. Under Community law, a recital functions in a manner that is similar to a statement
of purpose in a statute adopted by the U.S. government or a state government. A recital is not
binding, but courts will use recitals to interpret the operative provisions of a Community
measure.
'42. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, recital 18, at 3.
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Member States' legal requirements relating to goods such as safety
standards, labelling obligations, or liability for goods, or Member States'
requirements relating to the delivery or the transport of goods, including
the distribution of medicinal products .. .
Thus, France retains the authority to regulate, for example, the qual-
ity of the binding of books, including Mein Kampf, or to ensure that the
paper is resistant to aging. France also may regulate the way books are
transported. France no doubt could ban shipment of Mein Kampf into or
within France. These laws would regulate Mein Kampf as a good. But a
French law that prohibits display of Mein Kampf for sale restricts the
ability of a website operator to sell goods online, and therefore does not
relate to "goods as such." Thus, the law should fall within the coordi-
nated field and be subject to the "country of origin" rule.
It also has been suggested that the "country of origin" rule would not
apply to France's prohibition on display of Nazi materials for sale be-
cause the "country of origin" rule does not cover content regulations."
According to this argument, the coordinated field must be interpreted
narrowly to include only prudential or technical rules related to the es-
tablishment and operation of online businesses. It is, of course,
impossible to predict with certainty how the courts ultimately will inter-
pret the "country of origin" rule. But the definition of the "coordinated
field" states that rules related to the "quality or content" of a-service are
included . Moreover, as discussed in Subsection 3 below, the E-
Commerce Directive establishes an override mechanism that allows a
Member State to derogate from the "country of origin" rule and enforce
certain types of content restrictions such as those enacted by Frince.46 It
would make no sense to create a derogation from the "country of origin"
rule for content restrictions if the rule itself did not cover those restric-
tions in the first place. 7
43. Id. recital 21, at 4.
44. Catherine Kessedjian, Oral Remarks at AALS 2002 Annual Meeting (Jan. 3, 2003),
available from Recorded Resources Corporation, AALS 2002 Annual Meeting, Tape 42, Sec-
tion on Conflict of Laws-Conflicts in the Cyberage.
45. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
46. See infra notes 65-78 and accompanying text.
47. Underlying this debate about the scope of the "country of origin" rule is a difficult
question about whether and to what extent the EC Treaty empowers the EC to restrict Member
State authority in the area of criminal law. Since France's prohibition on display of Nazi mate-
rials is a penal measure, some might argue that the EC has no authority to restrict France's
application of the prohibition to materials originating in other Member States. A discussion of
EC "constitutional" law is beyond the scope of this Article. For my purposes, it is sufficient to
note that the E-Commerce Directive itself clearly assumes that it covers content restrictions as
well as other issues that may be subject to penal rules. The Directive identifies "prevention,
investigation, detection and prosecution of criminal offences" as a ground for triggering the
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Before turning to the various limitations on the "country of origin"
rule and how they might apply to the scenario in the Yahoo! case, it is
important to make explicit a point that is implicit in the discussion thus
far. An information society service provider such as Yahoo! Inc. that is
established in the United States cannot rely on the E-Commerce Direc-
tive to protect itself from application of French law. Article 3(2), which
contains the "country of origin" rule, prohibits Member States from
"restrict[ing] the freedom to provide information society services from
another Member State." Article 3(2) does not prohibit a Member State
from restricting the freedom to provide information society services
from countries such as the United States that are not members of the
EU. 48 At the same time, the E-Commerce Directive does not require
Member States to discriminate between websites based in the EU and
websites based outside the EU in deciding whether to apply their na-
tional laws. It simply permits them to do so if they wish, and, as the
Yahoo! case suggests, some Member States are likely to wish to do so.
International application of the "country of origin" rule probably would
require an international agreement of the sort discussed in Part III of
this Article.
2. Exceptions and Limitations
In the broader context of Community law, the E-Commerce Direc-
tive is quite unusual. Typically, when the EC introduces a "country of
origin" rule or a form of home country control, it does so in connection
with Community legislation that imposes detailed harmonization re-
quirements. Thus, Member State A is expected to refrain from
regulating a service originating in Member State B because the laws in
Member States A and B are required to be very similar, if not identical.
The Data Protection Directive49 provides what may be the best known
override mechanism. Id. art. 3(4)(a)(i), at 10. As recital 26 states, "Member States, in confor-
mity with conditions established in this Directive, may apply their national rules on criminal
law and criminal proceedings." Id. recital 26, at 4 (emphasis added). The Directive also states
that it is not intended to alter the substance of Member State criminal law. Its objective is "to
create a legal framework to ensure the free movement of information society services between
Member States and not to harmonise the field of criminal law as such." Id. recital 8, at 2.
Thus, the Directive does not purport to require France to adopt new or different criminal laws,
but it does purport to limit France's authority to criminalize the activities of service providers
based in other Member States.
48. As the European Commission stated, the Directive "does not cover, at this stage,
Information Society services provided by a person established in a third country." Commis-
sion Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on Certain Legal Aspects of
Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market, COM(98)586 final at 16 [hereinafter Proposed
E-Commerce Directive].
49. Data Protection Directive, supra note 19.
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example of this approach. Member States agreed to permit the free
flow of personal data across national borders, but only because every
Member State was required to adopt strict rules covering all aspects of
the processing of personal data. The E-Commerce Directive is different
because it imposes a broad "country of origin" rule without harmoniz-
ing the relevant areas of law. As the European Commission stated,
"[t]he approach is to interfere as little as possible with national legal
rules and to do so only where it is strictly necessary for the proper
functioning of the area without frontiers."5° Only once previously-in
the Television Without Frontiers Directive-had the Community
adopted a broad "country of origin" rule without attempting more-or-
less complete harmonization of the relevant area of law.
Not surprisingly, the Member States were hesitant about adopting a
"country of origin" rule covering areas of the law that had not been
harmonized, because it would limit their ability to use their laws to
protect their citizens and businesses from Internet services based in
Member States with different, possibly less restrictive regulatory re-
gimes. Thus, they agreed to exclude several areas of law from the
scope of the E-Commerce Directive in general and the "country of ori-
gin" rule in particular. They also included a mechanism by which a
Member State may override the "country of origin" rule. These meas-
ures are discussed below in order to determine whether, and under what
conditions, France might be permitted to apply a law forbidding dis-
play of Nazi materials for sale to a website operator based in another
EU Member State.
a. General Exceptions to the Scope of the E-Commerce Directive
The E-Commerce Directive does not apply to several areas of law:
(1) taxation; (2) data privacy; (3) "questions relating to agreements or
practices governed by cartel law;" (4) certain activities of notaries;
(5) activities of attorneys representing clients, particularly before
courts; and (6) certain types of gambling activities 2 The first two areas
already are heavily regulated under Community law, and the latter four
are areas over which national governments, often backed by strong
domestic interests, insisted on retaining local authority over services
50. Proposed E-Commerce Directive, supra note 48, at 14.
51. Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 October 1989 on the Coordination of Certain
Provisions Laid Down by Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Con-
ceming the Pursuit of Television Broadcasting Activities, 1989 O.J. (L 298) 23, as amended by
Directive 97/36/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, 1997 O.J. (L 202) 60
[hereinafter Television Without Frontiers Directive].
52. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(5), at 8.
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provided from other Member States. A French law banning the display
for sale of Nazi materials probably would not be exempt from the
scope of the Directive under any of these provisions.
The Directive also contains a safe harbor for laws related to na-
tional and regional culture. The provision states: "It]his Directive does
not affect measures taken at Community or national level, in the re-
spect of Community law, in order to promote cultural and linguistic
diversity and to ensure the defence of pluralism."53 France might argue
that a law restricting the display for sale of Nazi materials is a measure
in defense of pluralism because the law seeks to deter the rise of Fas-
cist movements that are, among other things, totalitarian and explicitly
antipluralist. This is a complicated issue that cannot be discussed in
detail here. It is important to note, however, that there was considerable
debate throughout the adoption process about the need to include lan-
guage preserving the authority of Member States to enact legislation
that protects the cultural and linguistic diversity of the EU. A lengthy
recital reflects these concerns 4 Viewed against this backdrop, courts
should interpret the provision of the Directive allowing Member States
to act in defense of pluralism as referring to cultural and linguistic plu-
ralism.5 Countries subject to the Directive thus would remain free to
adopt laws that promote Internet access and use by cultural and linguis-
tic subgroups. More controversially, countries may be allowed to
impose language requirements on websites, including websites oper-
ated by organizations established in other EU Member States.
6
53. Id. art. 1(6), at 8.
54. The recital states that the Directive
should not hinder measures which Member States might adopt in conformity with
Community law to achieve social, cultural and democratic goals taking into account their
linguistic diversity, national and regional specificities as well as their cultural heritage,
and to ensure and maintain public access to the widest possible range of information so-
ciety services; in any case, the development of the information society is to ensure that
Community citizens can have access to the cultural European heritage provided in the
digital environment.
Id. recital 63, at 8.
55. The courts will have to confront a threshold question when interpreting the safe harbor
provision for cultural legislation. The provision covers national laws adopted "in the respect of
Community law." Thus, it could be argued that the provision applies only to Member State cultural
legislation that implements Community cultural legislation. Since France's anti-Nazi laws do not
implement EC law, the safe harbor would not apply. Countries seeking a broad cultural exclusion
will argue that "in the respect of Community law" means "consistent with Community law" and
that France's anti-Nazi laws pass the test. This issue cannot be resolved here. Suffice it to say that a
case could be made for both readings.
56. In April 1998, for example, a French appellate court threw out a case against the Georgia
Institute of Technology filed in 1996 by DWfence de la Langue Frangaise. Relying on the 1994 Loi
Toubon which stipulates that all advertising in France should be in French, the complaint had
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Countries probably would not be free, however, to apply to website
operators based in other Member States laws that ban particular types
of Internet content that allegedly undermine political pluralism and
democracy.1
7
b. Exceptions to the "Country of Origin" Rule
In addition to the general exemptions from the scope of the E-
Commerce Directive, there are several exceptions that are specific to
the "country of origin" rule itself. The rule does not cover:
58
* copyright," neighboring rights, and certain other intellectual
and industrial property rights;
" the emission of electronic money by certain financial institu-
tions;6°
alleged that the Institute illegally used only English on its website. The court rejected the case on the
technical ground that the public prosecutor had not been informed before the charges were filed. For
discussions of the Loi Toubon and the Georgia Tech case, see Stacy Amity Feld, Note, Language
and the Globalization of the Economic Market: The Regulation of Language as a Barrier to Free
Trade, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153 (1998); Christine Vanston, Note, In Search of the Mot Juste:
The Toubon Law and the European Union, 22 B.C. INT'L & COMe. L. REv. 175 (1999).
57. While the E-Commerce Directive was being adopted, the Member States engaged in a
lively debate over whether and to what extent the Directive would establish new rules of private
international law, which in Continental countries serve essentially the same purpose as "conflict of
laws" rules in the United States. EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAws 1-2 (3d ed. 2000).
The result of this debate was article 1(4), which states that "[t]his Directive does not establish
additional rules on private international law." E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, art. 1(4), at 8. A
recital reiterates the point, but adds an important caveat: "provisions of the applicable law
designated by rules of private international law must not restrict the freedom to provide information
society services as established in this Directive" Id. recital 23, at 4. Reinforcing this caveat, another
recital states: "National courts, including civil courts, dealing with private law disputes can take
measures to derogate from the freedom to provide information society services in conformity with
conditions established in this Directive" Id. As discussed below, however, the Directive appears to
impose a somewhat less burdensome regime on Member State authorities-perhaps including
courts-that are involved in detecting and prosecuting violations of criminal law. See infra notes 68
and 75 and accompanying text. These complex and arguably inconsistent provisions on private
international law reinforce a point made by Mathias Reimann: EC rules affecting private
international law are complex and confusing, and often the "creatures of political preferences."
MATHIAS REIMANN, CONFLICT OF LAWS IN WESTERN EUROPE 96-97 (1995). The relationship
between the E-Commerce Directive and private international law is a topic that lies beyond the
scope of this Article, but it is important to take note of the issue, because it could influence the ways
in which courts interpret the "country of origin" rule. For additional discussion of the issue, see
Pearce & Platten, supra note 27, at 374-76.
58. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, art. 3(3), annex, at 9, 16.
59. In the EU, copyright on the Internet is governed by, among other things, the Copyright
Directive. See supra notes 15-18, and accompanying text.
60. See Council and Parliament Directive 2000/46/EC of 18 September 2000 on the Taking
Up, Pursuit of and Prudential Supervision of the Business of Electronic Money Institutions, 2000
OJ. (L 275) 39.
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• certain provisions of EC securities law and insurance law;
* the freedom of parties to choose the law applicable to their
contract;6'
• contractual obligations concerning consumer contacts;
62
• the formal validity of real estate contracts where such con-
tracts are subject to formal requirements in the Member State
where the real estate is situated; and
• the permissibility of unsolicited commercial communications
by electronic mail.
In each of these areas, a Member State is permitted-but not re-
quired-to apply its national law to an online service originating in
another Member State.
It does not appear that France would be able to take advantage of
any of the exceptions to the "country of origin" rule if a scenario such as
the Yahoo! case arose within the EU. Even if France were to recast the
underlying prohibition, the law probably would not qualify as, for exam-
ple, an intellectual property provision, or a provision related to
securities, insurance, issuance of electronic money, or formalities in a
real estate contract. One could imagine French courts refusing as a mat-
ter of policy to enforce a "contractual obligation" in an electronic
contract to buy Nazi materials, but such a rule would not come into play
unless a consumer sought relief from the contractual obligation.63
France's goal is not, however, to protect the innocent consumer of Nazi
materials from unscrupulous online sellers. Rather, France wants to pre-
vent all displays of such materials for sale in France. 6
61. This exception preserves the preexisting right of businesses under the Rome Con-
vention to determine which laws will govern the contracts that they enter with other
businesses. Convention on the Law Applicable to Contractual Obligations, June 19, 1980, art.
5(2), 1980 O.J. (L 266) 1, 3. In the absence of a choice-of-law clause, and in noncontractual
situations, the "country of origin" rule applies to businesses.
62. These "obligations" apparently include "information on the essential elements of
the content of the contract, including consumer rights, which have a determining influence on
the decision to contract." E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5, recital 56, at 7.
63. 1 assume that there is an equivalent under French law to the U.S. doctrine that a
contract term may be held unenforceable if it violates public policy. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1981).
64. Article 1(3) of the E-Commerce Directive contains a partial exemption for Member
State consumer protection legislation: "This Directive complements Community law applica-
ble to information society services without prejudice to the level of protection for, in
particular,... consumer interests, as established by Community acts and national legislation
implementing them in so far as this does not restrict the freedom to provide information soci-
ety services." Id. art. 1(3), at 8. A recital adds that the "Directive is without prejudice to the
level of protection for, in particular, ... consumer interests, as established by Community
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3. Override Mechanism
a. Outline of Mechanism
If France wishes to apply the prohibition on display of Nazi materi-
als for sale to a service provider based in another EU Member State,
France should activate the E-Commerce Directive's mechanism for over-
riding the "country of origin" rule. Under the override mechanism,
Member State A may impose its laws on a service originating in Member
State B if: (1) the objective that Member State A seeks to achieve is
"public policy" public health, public security, or consumer protection;
(2) the service "prejudices," or "presents a serious and grave risk of
prejudice" to, one of these objectives; and (3) Member State A's rules are
"necessary" and "proportionate" to the objective.65 The Directive eluci-
dates "public policy" as "in particular the prevention, investigation,
detection and prosecution of criminal offences, including the protection
of minors and the fight against any incitement to hatred on grounds of
race, sex, religion or nationality, and violations of human dignity con-
cerning individual persons." 6
The override mechanism requires Member States to follow specific
procedural steps. Except in urgent cases, before Member State A can
impose a particular law on a service originating in Member State B,
Member State A must ask Member State B to take appropriate measures
against the relevant service. Member State A should not act unless
Member State B refuses to intervene or takes steps that are not adequate.
67
Member State A also must inform the European Commission68 and
Member State B that it plans to override the "country of origin" rule.
Under the Directive, the Commission has the authority to "ask" Member
State A not to take or to withdraw measures that are inconsistent with EC
law, but the Commission cannot prevent Member State A from acting.69
acts" and lists some thirteen consumer protection directives that remain fully operative after
the adoption of the E-Commerce Directive. Id. recital 11, at 2. France's ban on display of Nazi
materials for sale clearly does not implement any of these EC consumer protection measures
and thus the partial exemption for Member State consumer protection legislation probably
would not block application of the "country of origin" rule.
65. Id. art. 3(4)(a), at 9-10.
66. Id. art. 3(4)(a)(i), at 9.
67. Id. art. 3(4)(b), at 10.
68. A Member State does not have to inform the Commission of the "investigative and
other measures" that it may take to detect and prosecute crimes. Id. recital 21, at 4.
69. Id. art. 3(6), at 10. Under the Commission's original draft of the E-Commerce Di-
rective, the Commission apparently would have had the authority to order a Member State to
refrain from taking, or to withdraw, a measure that the Commission had found to be incom-
patible with the Directive. See Proposed E-Commerce Directive, supra note 48, art. 22(3)(d),
at 5 1. The Member States were not prepared to grant the Commission this power.
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Rather, in a situation where Member State A disregards the Commission's
views, the Commission would have to issue a complaint (known as a
"reasoned opinion") against Member State A.70 If Member State A still
refuses to change its approach, the Commission would have to take
Member State A to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the theory
that Member State A's actions yiolate Community law.' Member State B
also would have the authority to take Member State A to the ECJ,
although Member State B first would have to take the matter to the
Commission. 2
b. Application of Override Mechanism to Yahoo! Case Scenario
In a Yahoo! case scenario, France could seek to use the override
mechanism to impose on a seller in another Member State the ban on
displays of Nazi materials for sale. France first would have to ask the
pertinent authorities in that Member State to take action against the
seller. If the seller is based in a Member State such as Germany that has
laws restricting sales of Nazi materials,73 the Member State probably
would respond by enforcing those laws against the seller, thereby ending
the dispute. In effect, France would be asking the Member State to live
up to its obligation under article 3(1) of the E-Commerce Directive to
enforce its laws against service providers established within its borders.
Thus, the outcome would reinforce rather than override the "country of
origin" rule and home country control.
If, on the other hand, the Member State to which France directs a re-
quest for action is a country such as the United Kingdom that apparently
permits sales-of Nazi materials, the process may be considerably more
complicated. Presumably, the U.K. authorities would refuse to take en-
forcement action on the ground that there is no relevant law to enforce.
U.K. authorities might discuss the issue with the pertinent service pro-
vider, and perhaps generally encourage online sellers based in the United
Kingdom voluntarily to stop selling and, if possible, displaying products
in France that violate French law.74 Some U.K. sellers might agree to
70. EC TREATY art. 226.
71. Id.
72. Id. art. 227.
73. For a discussion of Germany's anti-Nazi laws and their effect on the Internet, see
Kim L. Rappaport, In the Wake of Reno v. ACLU: The Continued Struggle in Western Constitu-
tional Democracies with Internet Censorship and Freedom of Speech Online, 13 AM. U. INT'L
L. REV. 765, 785-88 (1998).
74. The E-Commerce Directive requires Member States to "encourage... the drawing
up of codes of conduct regarding the protection of minors and human dignity." E-Commerce
Directive, supra note 5, art. 16(l)(e), at 13-14. The United Kingdom thus could encourage
sellers to adopt a voluntary code of conduct that prohibits sale of Nazi materials as an affront
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change their behavior, if the U.K. government can persuade them that the
alternative could be legal action in French courts under French law. As-
suming, however, that the United Kingdom is not prepared to adopt
legislation banning display of Nazi materials for sale, it seems likely that
at least some U.K. companies would continue to take advantage of their
freedom to sell such materials online to French consumers. Thus, France
would be within its rights to take the next step under the override
mechanism.
The next step would be for France to notify the European Commis-
sion75 and the U.K. government that it will enforce its ban on displays of
Nazi materials for sale against U.K. companies. The Commission and
the United Kingdom then would have the opportunity to review France's
action to determine whether it is consistent with Community law, includ-
ing the E-Commerce Directive. Among other things, the Commission
and the United Kingdom would look at whether (1) France's objective
falls within the category of "public policy" as defined in the E-
Commerce Directive and (2) France's action truly is "necessary" and
"proportionate" to France's objective. With respect to the first issue, an
opponent to French action might argue that a ban on display of Nazi ma-
terials for sale is not an effort to prevent attacks on human dignity or
incitement to racial and religious hatred. Rather, it is simply an effort to
prevent French consumers from seeing displays for sale of artifacts that
are of continuing historical and political interest. Seeing Mein Kampf
displayed for sale will not incite French consumers to hate the people
that Hitler hated, or so it could be argued.
Although it is too early to tell how the Commission or the various
Member State governments will handle this type of debate, it is likely
that they would favor the French position. In a brief discussion of the
override mechanism in the original draft of the E-Commerce Directive,
the Commission stated "[i]t would, for example, be out of the question
for the Commission to prevent a Member State from applying a law
which would forbid the arrival of racist messages."76 The Commission
likely would have little difficulty finding that the displays banned by
to human dignity. Whether and to what extent the U.K. government would be prepared to do
so is not clear. Even if such a code were adopted, it probably would not suffice to prevent
France from taking action under the override mechanism against U.K.-based online organiza-
tions that persist in selling Nazi materials within France.
75. In light of recital 21, supra note 68, it is not entirely clear when France-or a
French court-would be required to notify the Commission of the possibility that a French
criminal law might be imposed on a website operator based in another Member State. France
clearly should inform the other Member State early enough to give the other Member State an
opportunity to exercise home country control.
76. Proposed E-Commerce Directive, supra note 48, at 33.
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France communicate racist messages, and that the French government
may take steps under the override mechanism to prevent their "arrival" in
France. Despite the Commission's efforts to liberalize the European ad-
vertising market,77 the Commission probably would not distinguish
between a marketing message that encourages people to buy Mein
Kampf and a political message that encourages people to agree with the
views expressed in Mein Kampf. Moreover, in light of Europe's histori-
cal experience, it seems unlikely that any Member State would publicly
defend the right to display Nazi materials for sale on the ground that
such display does not incite hatred or attack human dignity.
With respect to the second issue mentioned above-whether
France's action in pursuit of its objective is necessary and proportion-
ate-the analysis would depend upon what action France takes. Thus,
for example, if France were to enforce its law in a way that effectively
prevents a U.K. seller from selling products within the United Kingdom
that are lawful under U.K. law, the Commission and/or the U.K. gov-
ernment might conclude that France's proposal is not proportionate to
the objective of protecting residents of France from displays of Nazi ma-
terials for sale. The Commission and/or the United Kingdom then could
ask France to modify its approach, and threaten to take France to the
ECJ if France fails to comply with the E-Commerce Directive. The
analysis would be much less clear-cut if France attempted-as it did in
the Yahoo! case-to force a U.K. service provider to take technical steps
to block access by Internet users located in France to offers for sale of
Nazi materials. Assuming the technology is available to accomplish, at
least in part, such blocking, France could argue that the proposed meas-
ure is proportionate to France's objective of preventing French
consumers from seeing Nazi materials for sale. France also could argue
the measure is necessary to achieve France's objective, because the only
alternative is to allow French consumers to be exposed to materials that
France does not want them to see.
Based on the author's experience with officials in the European
Commission responsible for overseeing the operation of the Internal
Market, the author believes there would be an informal effort to persuade
France not to attempt to force U.K. sellers to implement blocking tech-
nology. Rather, Commission officials might encourage France to focus
on actual sales of Nazi materials within France. France could penalize a
U.K. seller for shipping illegal products to France without requiring the
77. For a summary of the Commission's efforts in this area, see Mark Kightlinger &
Stephan Jaggi, A Liberal Regulatory Framework for Online Advertising in the EU, COMMUNI-
CATOR (European Ass'n of Com. Agencies 2000), at 29.
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seller to make expensive, technologically challenging changes in its
website. France even could seek to penalize a seller for allowing French
consumers to purchase and download Nazi materials (e.g., a digital copy
of Mein Kampj). Presumably, Commission officials would point out that
blocking technologies of the sort that France wants to impose will never
prevent displays of Nazi materials from reaching France via the Internet.
Even moderately sophisticated French consumers will be able to access
such displays if they wish. Thus, the Commission might argue, France
may succeed in imposing costly new technologies on a few website op-
erators in the United Kingdom, but France will not succeed in preventing
French consumers from viewing Nazi materials offered for sale on the
Internet.
France may counter that it cannot be prevented from taking legal
action against displays of Nazi materials emanating from other EU
Member States simply because such legal action will not be 100 percent
successful. Rather, France should be allowed to take steps that will
reduce the volume of Nazi material available online to French
consumers, and make it more difficult for consumers to access such
material. Moreover, France can point out that stopping shipments of
Nazi materials at the border, although important, will not achieve
France's broader legislative purpose-preventing the display of Nazi
materials for sale in France. The E-Commerce Directive's override
mechanism allows France, not the European Commission or other
Member States, to define the scope of French laws that seek to prevent
attacks on human dignity and incitement to hatred on the basis of race or
religion. France has decided to ban displays of Nazi materials for sale,
and neither the Commission nor the United Kingdom may insist that
France adopt a narrower or less aggressive law.
In light of these arguments, the European Commission may have dif-
ficulty building a legal case that France's actions are unnecessary or
disproportionate, if France insists on imposing a Yahoo!-type blocking
requirement on U.K. service providers. Even if a plausible legal case
could be constructed, the full Commission might not be prepared to take
action against France-particularly if the two Commissioners from
France oppose such action.7 ' As noted above, if the Commission fails to
take legal action, another Member State could challenge France's posi-
tion in the ECJ. Thus, the United Kingdom could seek to defend service
providers based in its territory against imposition of French law.
78. In theory, members of the European Commission do not represent the Member
States from which they originate. In reality, however, Member State loyalties influence the
actions of Commissioners, particularly with respect to proposals to take particular Member
States to court for violating Community law.
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Whether the U.K. government would be prepared to do so, however, is
not at all clear, given the legal hurdles outlined above and the political
implications of being seen to support free speech for sellers and buyers
of Nazi materials.
In this context, it should be noted that the E-Commerce Directive
does not provide a mechanism through which a private organization can
challenge a Member State for failure to abide by the "country of origin"
rule. Thus, for example, if France takes an action that an organization
established in the United Kingdom believes violates the organization's
rights under the Directive, the organization may have to ask the United
Kingdom for help or challenge France's actions in France's courts. A
Member State's lower courts may, and a Member State's highest court
must, refer a question of EC law to the ECJ, if the Member State court
cannot decide the case without addressing the EC law question.79 The
ECJ in turn may find that the Member State's actions violate the E-
Commerce Directive, and declare them invalid. This process can take a
considerable amount of time, and as with any litigation, may lead to re-
sults that are not satisfactory from the point of view of the organization
challenging the Member State law.
c. Significance of Override Mechanism
From the analysis presented in the preceding Subsection, it might
appear that the override mechanism would give France carte blanche to
apply its anti-Nazi legislation to website operators in other Member
States. Thus, it might be asserted, the E-Commerce Directive does not
provide a European solution to the problem presented by the Yahoo!
case. Indeed, it simply institutionalizes the problem. As Part III of this
Article argues, however, it is precisely this effort to institutionalize the
problem that may make the E-Commerce Directive a potential model for
a broader international solution.
Leaving aside the international dimension, however, it is useful to
imagine how the scenario in the Yahoo! case might unfold if there were
no E-Commerce Directive. Within the general limits imposed by
Community law, France would be free to take action against any service
provider, foreign or domestic, for any violation of French law. Moreover,
under the Brussels Regulation, France might be able to obtain more-or-
less automatic enforcement of the judgment in every Member State. °
79. EC TREATY art. 234. Needless to say, Member State courts have become adept at
characterizing and recharacterizing alleged questions of EC law, depending on whether the
courts do or do not wish the ECJ to become involved.
80. Brussels Regulation, supra note 23, arts. 32-56, at 10-12. France likely would not
be able to rely on the Brussels Regulation to obtain cross-border enforcement within the EU of
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France would not have to inform the European Commission or the
affected Member States of any proposed action. The Commission and
other Member States would remain free to challenge French actions in
the ECJ,8' but there would be no explicit "country of origin" rule to limit
France's authority to restrict online services originating in other Member
States. Thus, the scope of ECJ review of any French action would be
limited. There probably would be little question under Community law
of France's authority to apply the ban on displays of Nazi materials for
sale to website operators in other Member States. Thus, EU-based
website operators would have to confront the real possibility that their
websites might subject them to legal action under national laws in
France and fourteen other Member States. Such legal action might occur
not only under laws such as France's ban on displays of Nazi materials,
but under any economic or social legislation that a Member State
(consistent with Community law) might have adopted or might choose to
adopt.82 The need to navigate fifteen different legal regimes could
generate countless Yahoo! cases and thus have a significant chilling
effect on the development of European online services. The E-
Commerce Directive was intended to address this problem by subjecting
each online service to one Member State's legal regime under most
circumstances, and by creating an institutional mechanism for handling
cases in which another Member State nevertheless may wish to impose
restrictions on that service. The following Sections of this Article
provide additional arguments in support of this general approach.
a judgment identical to the one in the Yahoo! case because that judgment was penal, not civil.
Id. art. 1(1), at 3. France could rely on the Brussels Regulation to enforce judgments applying
the full range of its noncriminal legislation to website operators based in other Member States.
81. A discussion of the possible legal bases for such a challenge is beyond the scope of
this Article. Suffice it to say that a Member State might argue, among other things, that the
French law violates the EC Treaty's provisions protecting and promoting "free movement" of
services in the internal market. EC TREATY arts. 3(l)(c), 14, 49-55. For a detailed analysis of
these provisions and the case law interpreting them, see JUKKA SNELL, GoODS AND SERVICES
IN EC LAW (2002). Typically, the EC supplements the provisions of the Treaty with secondary
legislation such as directives and regulations in order to achieve "free movement" in particular
service sectors. For a description of such secondary legislation in a particular sector (legal
services), see D. Bruce Shine, The European Union's Lack of Internal Borders in the Practice
of Law: A Model for the United States?, 29 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 207, 226-45
(2002). The E-Commerce Directive itself is intended to implement the EC Treaty's "free
movement" objectives in the field of online services. See E-Commerce Directive, supra note 5,
recital 8, at 2.
82. For a short description of the existing and proposed Member State legislation aimed
specifically at the Internet at the time the Commission proposed the E-Commerce Directive,
see Proposed E-Commerce Directive, supra note 48, at 8.
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III. PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT MODELED
ON THE E-COMMERCE DIRECTIVE
Despite the caveats and uncertainties discussed in Part II about how
the E-Commerce Directive will be interpreted by Member States and the
ECJ, the Directive could provide a model for an international solution to
the problems presented by the Yahoo! case. As discussed below, such a
solution would take the form of an international agreement defining the
limits of national authority to regulate the Internet. Section A argues that
the agreement should incorporate the basic structure of the Directive: a
"country of origin" rule coupled with home country control, a limited list
of exceptions, and an override procedure. Section B discusses the poten-
tial stumbling blocks, again drawing on the experience of the E-
Commerce Directive. Disagreements could arise over, among other
things, cultural protection legislation, privacy, taxation, and consumer
protection. Section C argues that the best path to compromise on some
of the more contentious issues would be to rely more heavily than does
the E-Commerce Directive on the override mechanism. Finally, Section
D discusses whether an international agreement of the sort described in
the previous Sections is worth pursuing. It argues that a properly crafted
international agreement could prove beneficial for all concerned because
it would increase the level of legal certainty and enhance compliance
without preventing countries that participate in the agreement from en-
forcing their most important national policies against Internet services
originating in other participating countries.
Before turning to these issues, however, it may be useful to make a
couple of points about the practical advantages of using the E-
Commerce Directive as a model for an international solution. The first
point is that the E-Commerce Directive already is an international solu-
tion. Although there is some disagreement about what kind of legal
entity the EU is,83 almost every observer would agree that the EU lies
somewhere on the spectrum between the North American Free Trade
Agreement on the one hand and a federal nation state such as the United
States of America or the Federal Republic of Germany on the other hand.
The Member States of the EU retain considerable national sovereignty
and in that sense the EU is an international organization. Thus, the E-
Commerce Directive, as a legislative act of the European Community,
already is an international effort to define the limits on national authority
to regulate the Internet.
83. There is an extensive literature on this issue. See, e.g., Ilann Margalit Maazel, What
is the European Union?, 16 BYU J. PuB. L. 243 (2002); Lenaerts, supra note 8.
[Vol. 24:719
A Solution to the Yahoo! Problem?
The second point follows from the first. Currently, fifteen countries
are bound by the E-Commerce Directive. Soon, the number will rise to
twenty-five. If an international instrument modeled on the Directive
could retain the support of these twenty-five countries and gain five or
six more key adherents (e.g., the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia,
and perhaps one or two economically significant developing nations such
as India and Malaysia), the instrument would cover most of the existing
electronic marketplace. It is not suggested here that building an interna-
tional agreement on top of the Directive would be an easy matter. Still, at
least in theory, revising the E-Commerce Directive to attract new adher-
ents may be easier than starting from scratch with an approach to which
there are no adherents. Of course, the fact that the EU already has
adopted the E-Commerce Directive could work against its use as a
model for a broader international solution. U.S. representatives to the
Hague Conference reacted negatively to suggestions by European coun-
tries that key provisions of the Brussels Regulation should provide the
basis for a new global convention on jurisdiction and enforcement of
judgments.84 The United States did not wish to be presented with afait
accompli by the Europeans. Moreover, there are precedents for develop-
ing a significant international convention in a genuinely multilateral
manner. For example, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) developed the United Nations Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG) through a Working
Group representing different legal traditions in order to avoid following a
particular regional approach that might limit acceptance of the final
text.85 Even the UNCITRAL Working Group found it useful to draw on
the earlier Uniform Law for the International Sale of Goods, which was
"the product of the legal scholarship of Western Europe."86 As the CISG
example shows, the E-Commerce Directive might serve as a model for
an international agreement not because a large bloc of countries already
adheres to the Directive, but because the Directive's substantive ap-
proach makes sense to a broader group of countries. The next Section
outlines the key substantive elements of an international agreement
modeled on the Directive and explains how they may assist in addressing
the types of problems presented by the Yahoo! case.
84. Letter from Jeffrey D. Kovar, Assistant Legal Adviser for Private International Law,
to J.H.A. van Loon, Secretary General, Hague Conference on Private International Law 10
(Feb. 2, 2000) (on file with author).
85. JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 9-10 (1991).
86. Id. at 10.
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A. Key Elements of an International Solution
Using the E-Commerce Directive as a model, the key elements of an
international agreement defining the limits of national authority to regu-
late the Internet are forbearance and home country control, minimum
harmonization, and the establishment of an administrative process for
handling potential disputes. In order for such an agreement to function, it
probably would have to be embedded in an institutional structure. The
WTO may be the best institutional setting, although others such as the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) or
the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) should be consid-
ered. A discussion of possible exceptions to the principle of forbearance
is deferred to Section B. The argument presented below is not intended
to provide the details of a possible international agreement, let alone ac-
tual language, but rather to identify the likely key elements and explain
how they relate to the Yahoo! problem.
1. Forbearance and Home Country Control
The centerpiece of an international agreement defining the limits on
national authority to regulate the Internet would be a strong principle of
forbearance combined with a principle of home country control.
Participating countries would agree not to apply their national laws to
websites operated by people or organizations established in other
participating countries." At the same time, each participating country
would agree to enforce its legal regime, and therefore oversee the online
activities of organizations established within its national territory. Thus,
at least in principle, the agreement would provide that in scenarios such
as the Yahoo! case, the country of origin (the United States) should apply
87. To limit disagreements about where a website operator is established, participating
countries also should agree on basic principles of establishment. The E-Commerce Directive
endorses principles that the ECJ has developed to resolve such disagreements. See supra note
35. These principles might provide a basis for an international consensus. Without some
agreement on principles for determining where a website operator is established, national
authorities and courts will have to rely on existing national rules. This will require decisions
about which country's rules of establishment should apply in particular cases. This "choice of
law" analysis could recreate the conflicting claims of authority to regulate the Internet that the
hypothetical international agreement was intended to resolve. It is not clear, however, whether
disagreements over where an organization is established will be a significant practical problem
(as opposed to an interesting theoretical concern). The Yahoo! case, for example, did not trig-
ger a debate about where Yahoo! is established. Everyone agrees that the Yahoo! parent
company is established in California. The question was and is whether and to what extent
France should be able to regulate Yahoo!'s conduct in spite of the fact that Yahoo! is not estab-
lished in France. Presumably, Yahoo! still would be established in California under an
international agreement based on the E-Commerce Directive, and France probably would not
try to claim otherwise.
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its laws to the service provider, and the country of reception (France)
should refrain from applying its laws. As discussed below, whether this
would be the result in practice would depend on, among other things, the
scope of any exceptions to the principle of forbearance, and the flexibility
of any override mechanism that the agreement may incorporate.
There is an important practical advantage to including a provision
mandating home country control in an international agreement delimit-
ing national authority to regulate the Internet. Participating countries
could use such a provision as a standard by which to judge other coun-
tries that may wish to become signatories to the agreement. A country
might be excluded if it cannot demonstrate that it has, for example, a
functioning system of consumer protection laws backed by an effective
administrative and judicial structure. Participating countries thereby
could ensure that potential havens for scofflaws will not benefit from the
agreement and the special online "free trade zone" that it establishes. In
this connection, it is worth noting that concerns about, among other
things, potential haven countries led the EU Member States to exclude
copyright from the scope of the "country of origin" principle. Right
holder organizations likely would insist on a similar exclusion from any
international agreement defining the limits to regulate the Internet, at
least until piracy rates and copyright enforcement efforts reach a uni-
formly high level in all participating countries."
2. Minimum Harmonization
A second element of an international agreement delimiting national
authority to regulate the Internet may be a requirement that participating
countries harmonize certain provisions of national law. As discussed in
Section B below, lack of harmonization may present several important
stumbling blocks to an international agreement, and perhaps encourage
participating countries to create exceptions to the principle of forbear-
ance.89 Since these exceptions may generate conflicts such as the Yahoo!
case, participating countries have an incentive to consider harmoniza-
tion, wherever possible, as an alternative. The areas harmonized by the
E-Commerce Directive-e-contracting, commercial communications,
and service provider liability-may provide a starting point. In the first
two areas, the Directive focuses on ensuring that electronic contracts are
88. Right holder organizations have demonstrated that piracy rates and copyright en-
forcement efforts vary dramatically from country to country, both within the EU and more
generally. See, e.g., Business Software Alliance, Seventh Annual BSA Global Software Piracy
Study (2002), at http://www.bsa.org/usa/policyres/admin/2002-06-10.130.pdf.
89. For a brief summary of international efforts to harmonize laws affecting cyberspace
that already were underway in 1998, see Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1230-32.
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recognized under national law and requiring service providers to make
adequate disclosures to users. Most, if not all, of the countries that might
participate in an international agreement of the type under discussion
here presumably recognize electronic contracts and impose at least some
disclosure requirements, either by statute or through regulatory or judi-
cial precedents.9" Thus, limited harmonization may be relatively
straightforward, simply because there is little disagreement over the ba-
sic principles that should apply in such areas as e-contracting and online
commercial communications, although there may be disagreements
about how to implement and enforce these principles.
At first blush, the issue of service provider liability might seem like
a bigger challenge. In fact, the issue is largely resolved and perhaps
should not even be raised in the context of an international agreement
delimiting national authority to regulate the Internet. The E-Commerce
Directive's provisions on service provider liability are based on similar
provisions in the U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act. Thus, from the
perspective of the EU and the United States, the issue of service provider
liability is settled law. Whether the issue should be raised in a broader
international context is essentially a political decision, but it is not clear
why the EU or the United States would wish to do so. If the issue is
raised, it would make sense for the EU and the United States to insist
that other participating countries follow the EU-U.S. model.
As discussed in Section II.A, the E-Commerce Directive is one of
several measures affecting the Internet that the EU has adopted in recent
years. Although the Directive is linked to each of these other measures in
important ways, its adoption was not contingent on the adoption of any
of the other measures.9' Nevertheless, it may be important to consider
including provisions similar to one of the other measures-i.e., the
amended Transparency Directive-in a broader international agreement.
The amended Transparency Directive requires EU Member States to no-
tify the European Commission when they are considering legislative
proposals that may affect the Internet, and to observe a standstill period
before adopting such proposals into law.92 By including a transparency
provision in an international agreement delimiting national authority to
90. For a review of U.S. and other national laws applicable to e-contracting, online
advertising, and online consumer protection, see INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ELEC-
TRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 28.
91. For political reasons, the service provider liability provisions in the E-Commerce
Directive were linked to the Copyright Directive, and thus it might be accurate to say that
passage of the former was a precondition for passage of the latter. See E-Commerce Directive,
supra note 5, recital 50, at 7 (emphasizing that the E-Commerce Directive and the Copyright
Directive should "come into force within a similar time scale").
92. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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regulate the Internet, participating countries would establish a mecha-
nism for reporting to a central clearing house any relevant legislative
proposals that they may be considering. Such a transparency provision
might help to identify potential Yahoo! cases at their inception and pre-
vent them from arising. Depending on how the clearing house is
constituted, it could review the proposals for compliance with applicable
law and agreements, or pass the proposals on to other participating coun-
tries for such review, or both. In effect, the transparency provision would
be a sunshine rule, ensuring that all participating countries can watch
when one of their number considers legislation that may affect their in-
ternational rights and obligations.
3. Override Mechanism
A third key element of an agreement defining the limits on national
authority to regulate the Internet would be a procedure for overriding the
principle of forbearance. As the European Commission implicitly recog-
nized in its original draft of the E-Commerce Directive, countries will
agree to a "country of origin" rule in an environment where national
laws have not been harmonized only if they have a procedure for over-
riding the rule in certain types of cases that, in their view, reflect
important national policy objectives. Clearly, a similar compromise
would be required in any broader international agreement that requires
countries to refrain from imposing their national laws on Internet ser-
vices originating in other countries.
Although the participating countries would have to design the over-
ride mechanism, the structure established by the E-Commerce Directive
may provide a starting point. If Country A believes that a service pro-
vider in Country B is violating an important national policy of Country
A covered by the override mechanism, Country A first would be required
to ask Country B to intervene. If Country B refused, or took action that
Country A considered inadequate, Country A would be required to notify
Country B and the central clearing house that Country A plans to impose
a national law on a service provider based in Country B. Country B, and
any other interested country, then would have the opportunity to deter-
mine whether Country A's action exceeds the scope of the override
mechanism, and thus violates the agreement. The participating countries
would have to define in advance what, if any, recourse to grant Country
B if it concludes that Country A has violated the agreement. Depending
on the international agreement's institutional setting, alternatives might
range from arbitration to a dispute settlement proceeding in the WTO.
Some might argue that establishing a robust override mechanism de-
feats the fundamental purpose of an international agreement defining the
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limits of national authority to regulate the Internet. As was suggested in
the discussion of the E-Commerce Directive, by using the override
mechanism, a country such as France might be able to impose its law
prohibiting display of Nazi materials for sale on a service provider based
in another EU Member State. If France could override the forbearance
principle in an international agreement and impose its anti-Nazi legisla-
tion on website operators in other participating countries, including the
United States, would this not leave us back at square one (i.e., the Yahoo!
case)?
Yes and no. Yes, in the sense that France ultimately might succeed in
imposing its national laws on a case-by-case basis on foreign website
operators. No, in the sense that France would have to pass through a va-
riety of procedural hoops before doing so. If the international agreement
functioned properly, France would have to notify the United States as
soon as a case arose in which it was possible that a French law might be
applied to a U.S. website operator or other service provider. France
would have to ask the U.S. government to take action and thereby exer-
cise home country control. The U.S. government would have to review
the French request and determine what, if any, action it might take. Out-
side the high-pressure environment of a court case, U.S. and French
authorities might be able to achieve a reasonable, negotiated solution
with the website operator in question. The international agreement de-
scribed in this Article would provide them with an opportunity to do so.
The agreement would not solve the problem, but it might give the parties
time and space in which to craft a solution. Moreover, because the
agreement would require countries to put resources into discussing such
problems, countries would have an incentive to achieve workable solu-
tions and avoid allowing disputes to proliferate. The result should be an
increase in the number of amicable resolutions and a decrease in the
number of disputes.
Some might suggest that this line of argument is nafve and overly
optimistic. Why, they might ask, is there any reason to think that France,
the United States, and Yahoo! could have resolved the Yahoo! case
amicably? Isn't this a matter of principle for all concerned? In the
author's experience, companies such as Yahoo! generally prefer to avoid
engaging in legal disputes at a national or international level, even in
situations that might appear to involve matters of fundamental principle.
To illustrate this point, it may be useful to look briefly at the "Rules of
User Conduct" adopted by one of Yahoo!'s competitors in the online
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marketplace, America Online (AOL).93 In exchange for the opportunity
to use AOL's online services, users agree94 that they will not:
upload, post, or otherwise distribute or facilitate distribution of
any content-including text, communications, software, images,
sounds, data, or other information-that:
2. victimizes, harasses, degrades, or intimidates an individual or
group of individuals on the basis of religion, gender, sexual ori-
entation, race, ethnicity, age, or disability .... 9'
AOL does not state that it reserves the authority to take down Nazi
content, or to revoke the access privileges of users who may post such
content, but AOL probably could do so-or at least attempt to do so-
under its Rules of User Conduct. What is clear, however, is that AOL has
not adopted a broad principle of free speech similar to the First Amend-
ment in regard to the use of its online services. Thus, there is no reason
to believe that AOL or its competitors would insist on fighting with
France over the principle of free speech, if in turn France were prepared
to accept a solution that is not prohibitively expensive for online compa-
nies to implement. The override mechanism outlined above would give
the interested parties an opportunity to discuss such a solution.
Of course, even the most starry-eyed optimist must recognize that
some disputes are intractable. Thus, regardless of the terms of an
international agreement delimiting national authority to regulate the
Internet, France, Yahoo!, and the United States might reach an impasse,
and France might authorize or permit legal action against Yahoo! (as it
already has). In that situation, the United States would retain the right to
review France's action and, if appropriate, challenge that action in the
forum agreed upon by the participating countries. Moreover, the United
States would have a legal basis for such a challenge-the terms of the
forbearance principle and the override mechanism in the international
agreement-that it currently lacks. The United States might not prevail,
but then the United States and Yahoo! would be no worse off than they
are today. Moreover, the possibility that the United States-or another
participating country-might take France to an international dispute
93. Reidenberg makes a similar point about Yahoo!'s terms of service. Reidenberg,
supra note 3, at 265-66.
94. AOL Anywhere, AOL Anywhere Terms and Conditions of Use, at http://
www.aol.com/copyright.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
95. AOL Anywhere, Rules of User Conduct, at http://www.aol.com/copyright/
rules.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2003).
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settlement forum should act as a deterrent, encouraging France to take
action against foreign website operators only in clear-cut cases where
important principles are at stake.
4. Institutional Setting
This Article is not the place to address in detail the question of the
appropriate institutional setting for an international agreement defining
the limits on national authority to regulate the Internet. It is useful, how-
ever, to provide a brief preliminary discussion of this issue in order to
show that it is at least possible to find a "home" for such an agreement.
Several such homes present themselves, including the WTO, the OECD,
UNCITRAL, WIPO, or even the Council of Europe. Of these, the WTO
seems the most likely candidate. The primary purpose of the agreement
would be to eliminate national barriers to cross-border provision of elec-
tronic services of the sort presented by the Yahoo! case, and create a kind
of online "free trade zone." This is essentially the same purpose that the
E-Commerce Directive serves within the EU. The Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) allows WTO
member countries to negotiate "plurilateral agreements" and declares
those agreements to be binding on countries that accept them.96 The
WTO Agreement also requires the WTO to administer plurilateral
agreements. By characterizing as "plurilateral" an agreement delimiting
national authority to regulate the Internet, the participating countries
could take advantage of the WTO's infrastructure, without opening the
door to countries that are not prepared to accept the burdens as well as
the benefits of such an agreement (e.g., countries that are not prepared to
require that online service providers adhere to certain basic disclosure
requirements and comply with rules banning false and misleading adver-
tising). Against website operators in such nonparticipating countries, the
participating countries would retain full authority to take whatever
measures their national laws may allow to protect domestic businesses
97and consumers.
One advantage of using the WTO is the availability of a well-
developed dispute settlement infrastructure. Within the EU, the
European Commission and the Member States can use the ECJ to
enforce the E-Commerce Directive. Absent the EU's dispute settlement
mechanisms, the Directive and other elements of Community law would
96. Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994,
art. 11(4), LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M
13, 15-16 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreement].
97. "The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligations or rights for
Members that have not accepted them." Id. art. 11(3).
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be little more than pieces of paper. Although different from the EU's
mechanisms for enforcing EC law, the WTO's dispute settlement
structure gives real teeth to the many trade agreements adopted under the
WTO's auspices. 9" Thus, a country participating in a new plurilateral
agreement defining the limits of national authority to regulate the
Internet might request a dispute settlement panel in a case in which
another participating country imposed a national law on a foreign
website operator in violation of the agreement. The panel would hear
arguments on both sides and deliver an interpretation of the agreement
that is binding on both parties. The parties then would have a right to
appeal the panel's decision to the Appellate Body.99 Participating
countries would not, however, have to rely entirely on the existing WTO
dispute settlement infrastructure if they concluded that it was in some
respects unsuitable. They could incorporate special dispute resolution
provisions in the international agreement itself, and those provisions
might be administered by the WTO institutions.'00
As indicated above; other possible homes for a new agreement de-
limiting national authority to regulate the Internet include the OECD,
UNCITRAL, WIPO, and the Council of Europe. The OECD would not
be ideal, because its institutional focus is information exchange. As
noted below, the OECD has played a role in developing an international
consensus around principles of taxation and consumer protection for the
98. I do not mean to suggest that the WTO's mechanisms for enforcing the WTO
agreements are in any way similar to the EU's mechanisms for enforcing EC law. Among
other things, the WTO lacks a prosecutorial arm such as the European Commission with au-
thority to investigate the activities of member countries and take them to court if they fail to
comply with applicable agreements. Moreover, unlike the ECJ, WTO dispute panels do not
function as courts of appeal from WTO members' national courts. In addition, the EC Treaty
authorizes the ECJ to impose fines on Member States that fail to comply with the ECJ's judg-
ments. EC TREATY art. 228; see Case C-387/97, Commission v. Hellenic Republic, 2000
E.C.R. 1-5047 (ordering Greece to pay the Commission E20,000 per day for each day Greece
fails to implement an earlier judgment of the ECJ). By contrast, the WTO agreements recog-
nize the ultimate autonomy of the member countries by permitting them to back out of their
WTO commitments and impose appropriate tariffs in cases where a WTO member refuses to
abide by a dispute panel's decision. See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing
the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994, art. 22, WTO Agreement, Annex 2, LEGAL INSTRU-
MENTS-RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31 (1999), 33 I.L.M. 114, 115 [hereinafter
Dispute Settlement Understanding]. For a description of how this WTO process unfolded in a
particular dispute between the EU and the United States, see Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology
and International Law, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 47, 82 (2001).
99. Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 98, art. 17.
100. The Agreement on Implementation of Article VI, for example, contains special
dispute settlement provisions that supplement the Dispute Settlement Understanding. Agree-
ment on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994,
Apr. 15, 1994, art. XVI, WTO Agreement, Annex 1A, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 27 (1999), 1868 U.N.T.S. 2001.
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electronic marketplace.'0 ' Unlike the WTO, however, the OECD lacks a
dispute settlement infrastructure. Rather, as Fabrizio Pagani recently
suggested in an OECD-supported study, the OECD uses "peer review"
and "peer pressure" to encourage member countries to adopt common
approaches to key issues."' Peer pressure alone will not give teeth to a
new agreement delimiting national authority to regulate the Internet. Of
course, the OECD could be redesigned to perform dispute settlement
functions, but it is not clear why member countries would take that step
if they could leave the OECD intact and address the same issues within
the existing WTO infrastructure.
UNCITRAL may be an alternative to the OECD. UNCITRAL's goal
is "to further the progressive harmonization and unification of the law of
international trade."'' 3 Moreover, UNCITRAL has had some success in
preparing international agreements that facilitate international
commerce, including e-commerce 4 In addition, UNCITRAL has an
important advantage over the OECD. As a United Nations organization,
UNCITRAL's membership is broadly based. The OECD, by contrast,
remains something of a rich man's club, despite admitting members such
as Mexico that fall outside the traditional circle of developed nations.
But UNCITRAL shares the main disadvantage of the OECD-a lack of
dispute resolution mechanisms. "UNCITRAL's mandate by the General
Assembly does not extend to participation in either public or private
disputes. Consequently, UNCITRAL does not nominate arbitrators,
administer arbitrations, certify arbitral authorities, or offer legal advice
in specific disputes."'' 5 Countries wishing to negotiate an international
agreement delimiting national authority to regulate the Internet have no
compelling reason to ask the General Assembly to revise UNCITRAL's
mandate if they can achieve their goals through the existing WTO
infrastructure.
Unlike the OECD and UNCITRAL, WIPO and the Council of
Europe do have dispute settlement infrastructures. WIPO provides
101. See infra notes 132, 135.
102. Fabrizio Pagani, Peer Review: A Tool for Co-Operation and Change, An Analysis
of an OECD Working Method, OECD SG/LEG(2002)l (Sept. 11, 2002), available at
http://www.oecd.org/pdf/M00034000JM00034116.pdf.
103. UNCITRAL Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm
(last visited Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter UNCITRAL FAQs].
104. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. UNCITRAL has prepared a ModelLaw
on Electronic Commerce. U.N. Comm'n on Int'l Trade Law, UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Commerce with Guide to Enactment (1996), available at http://www.uncitral.org/
english/texts/electcomlml-ecomm.htm. For a discussion of the UNCITRAL Model Law, see
Mark Plotkin et al., Electronic Contracting, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE, supra note 28.
105. UNCITRAL FAQs, supra note 103.
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mediation and arbitration services for private parties with intellectual
property disputes,' and the Council of Europe operates the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR).' °7 WIPO probably would not be an
appropriate home for a new international agreement of the sort under
discussion, however, because WIPO deals exclusively with intellectual
property issues. '1 8 Although the new agreement might touch on such
issues, it will focus on problems of applicable law, which lie outside of
WIPO's traditional area of expertise. The ECHR resembles the WIPO
dispute settlement system in one respect: it has a relatively narrow
subject matter jurisdiction-protection of human rights under the
European Convention on Human Rights.' 9 It seems more sensible to
allow the ECHR to continue to focus on this important area, and let the
WTO take on the responsibility for administering a new agreement that
enhances free trade on the Internet. Moreover, the Council of Europe
resembles the OECD in that it has a relatively narrow membership."0
The WTO, by contrast, has 145 members."' Although the United States
participates in the work of the Council as an observer,"' the United
States is not a member, and the Council's traditional focus has been
European, not international issues."3
It should not be assumed that the relevant members of the WTO
would be enthusiastic about the idea of including within the WTO
framework an agreement delimiting national authority to regulate the
Internet. On the contrary, it is common knowledge that WTO members
have made little headway in dealing with e-commerce issues."4 Indeed,
106. See WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center, at http://arbiter.wipo.int/center/
background.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
107. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, arts. 19-51, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention on Human Rights].
108. WIPO's objectives are "to promote the protection of intellectual property through-
out the world" and to "ensure administrative cooperation among the [intellectual property
unions]." Convention Establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization, art. 3, July
14, 1967, as amended Sept. 28, 1979, available at http://www.wipo.int/clea/docs/en/wo/
wo029en.htm.
109. European Convention on Human Rights, supra note 107, art. 19.
110. Council of Europe's Member States, at http://www.coe.int/T/E/Communication_
andResearch/Contacts withjthepublic/About Council-of Europe/CoE_Map&_Members/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Council Members List] (listing forty-four members).
111. Members and Observers (Feb. 5, 2003), at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/
whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm.
112. Council Members List, supra note 110.
113. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, pmbl., Europ. T.S. No. 1, avail-
able at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm.
114. The WTO General Council adopted a somewhat ill-defined "work programme" on
electronic commerce in September 1998. See Work Programme Reflects Growing Importance,
at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/ecom-e/ecom_e_briefnotee.htm. In November 2001,
at the Doha Ministerial Conference, the WTO members were able to do little more than affirm
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to date, WTO members have not even been able to agree on how to char-
acterize many online products under the WTO legal regime."' Moreover,
unlike the EU, which has a real legislative process driven by the Euro-
pean Commission's views on what measures are needed to support the
objectives outlined in the EC Treaty, the WTO has no formal legislative
process or mechanisms. WTO agreements result from bargains among
WTO members. In areas that WTO members do not consider a priority
or on which they cannot find common ground, no agreement will occur.
An international agreement addressing the Yahoo! problem might en-
counter precisely this fate. '6 It is possible, however, that such an
agreement could attract interest from members who currently are not
sure what, if anything, the WTO can or should do about e-commerce. In
a recent review of progress on e-commerce issues, several WTO mem-
bers expressed interest in discussing a set of principles that would
encourage development of the electronic marketplace." 7 Thus, there may
be opportunities in the WTO context for work on an international agree-
ment of the sort under discussion here. If the WTO proves unable to
work on this issue, it may be necessary to reexamine the OECD or
WIPO as possible institutional homes. Alternatively, European countries
could look to the Council of Europe for a European solution.
B. Potential Stumbling Blocks
There are many contentious issues that countries might encounter if
they undertook to prepare an international agreement that deals with the
type of problem presented by the Yahoo! case. These include cultural
protection, privacy, application of taxes to the Internet, and consumer
protection, among others. This Article is not the place to review these
that electronic commerce "creates new challenges and opportunities," and "instruct the Gen-
eral Council to consider the most appropriate institutional arrangements for handling the Work
Programme." Id. Thus, after three years, the WTO was still thinking about how to deal with e-
commerce issues, and not about the issues themselves.
115. See Third Dedicated Discussion on Electronic Commerce Under the Auspices of
the General Council on 25 October 2002, WT/GC/W/486 (Dec. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Third
Dedicated Discussion] (discussing whether electronic products should be classified as goods
or services under the WTO agreements).
116. WTO members also might bargain their way to an agreement that is too weak or
vague to handle the Yahoo!-type cases that are likely to arise in practice. This is, of course, an
ever-present problem in the WTO context. Nevertheless, as the steady volume of WTO dispute
settlement activity suggests, WTO members are capable of reaching agreements with real
impact in the world. See Dispute Settlement: The Disputes, at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratope/dispu-e/dispu-statuse.htm#2002 (last visited Feb. 21, 2003) (listing 281
disputes filed since 1995). There is no reason to believe that they could not do so here, if they
wished.
117. See, e.g., Third Dedicated Discussion, supra note 115, at 2.
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issues in detail, but it is useful to discuss them briefly because each area
could generate Yahoo!-type conflicts between countries that are not sub-
ject to the E-Commerce Directive. Moreover, since each of these areas is
excluded in whole or in part from the E-Commerce Directive, there
would be considerable pressure to exclude them from a new international
agreement. Clearly, however, if too many important areas are excluded,
the agreement may not be worth negotiating, let alone adopting. Thus,
EU Member States may have to decide up front whether they would be
prepared to accept an agreement that covers more areas of the law (or
excludes fewer) than the E-Commerce Directive itself. Other participat-
ing countries would have to determine how much of the Directive's
framework of exclusions they could accept. The Article returns to this
issue in Section C, below, where it outlines a possible compromise that
places greater reliance on the override mechanism than does the Direc-
tive.
Perhaps the primary stumbling block to an agreement delimiting na-
tional authority to regulate the Internet would be disagreements over
whether it is necessary or appropriate to carve out an exception for na-
tional laws that purport to protect or promote culture. This issue proved
notoriously divisive during the Uruguay Round negotiations over what
became the WTO General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
Several European countries,"' with support from other quarters, insisted
on retaining the right to apply cultural legislation to television, film, and
other services."9 The United States, with strong support from domestic
motion picture studios, fought for a regime that would have treated such
cultural legislation as an illegal trade barrier.'2° Ultimately, the United
States backed down, after obtaining commitments that the issue would
be revisited in the context of ongoing efforts to liberalize trade in ser-
vices. "' This same issue arose within the EU itself, when some Member
118. For general background on the debates within the EU about cultural legislation, see
Collette B. Cunningham, Note, In Defense of Member State Culture: The Unrealized Potential
of Article 151(4) of the EC Treaty and the Consequences for EC Cultural Policy, 34 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 119 (2001).
119. JOHN CROOME, RESHAPING THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 311 (2d ed. 1999); see
Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright's Democratic Principles in the Global Arena, 51
VAND. L. REV. 217, 317-22 (1998).
120. CROOME, supra note 119, at 311. For further background on disagreements between
the EU and United States over cultural legislation, see Tina W. Chao, Comment, GATIs Cul-
tural Exemption of Audiovisual Trade: The United States May Have Lost the Battle but Not the
War, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1127 (1996).
121. See General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XVI, WTO
Agreement, Annex I B, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND vol.
28, 33 I.L.M 44, 61 (1994) (requiring member countries to negotiate to achieve "progressive
liberalization"); Netanel, supra note 119, at 318 n.395.
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States insisted on including an exemption for cultural legislation in the
E-Commerce Directive, 2  raising fears that Member States might enact
content requirements for the Internet of the sort that have been adopted
for television broadcasting.' 23 Given the strength of concern about cul-
tural issues in some EU Member States and other countries, any effort to
define the limits on national authority to regulate the Internet is likely to
trigger a request for an exemption covering cultural legislation.' 4 Pre-
dictably, the U.S. government may reply that the principle of forbearance
should apply to this field. As a practical matter, the only way to avoid
another bruising battle over a "cultural exemption" may be to defer the
issue to the ongoing Doha Round GATS negotiations.'25 If WTO mem-
bers successfully resolve the issue, their resolution should be crafted in a
manner that would render it applicable to the Internet.
Privacy or data protection is another area that might prove conten-
tious during negotiations over a possible agreement defining national
authority to regulate the Internet. Most EU Member States now have
adopted laws implementing the Data Protection Directive, 26 and national
data commissioners in each country are beginning to explore the territo-
rial scope of these new privacy laws. A Working Party of the national
data commissioners recently published a paper suggesting that in many
instances, companies based outside the EU that collect personal informa-
tion via the Internet from people living in the EU may be expected to
comply with Member State data protection laws. 7 The United States
does not have a comprehensive national privacy law, and is unlikely to
122. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
123. Television Without Frontiers Directive, supra note 51, arts. 5, 6 (requiring broad-
casters to reserve a portion of their broadcast time to transmit "European works").
124. Canadian officials have been among the leaders in seeking special consideration for
minority cultures in the context of the WTO. See International Network on Cultural Policy, at
http://www.pch.gc.ca/progs/ai-ia/ridp-irpd/04/index-e.cfmnav=2 (last visited Feb. 7, 2003).
Canada and France, among others, have been actively seeking to develop a Convention on
Cultural Diversity that would remove cultural issues from the WTO context. See An Interna-
tional Instrument on Cultural Diversity, at http://206.191.7.19/meetings/2002/instrument-
e.shtml (last visited Feb. 7, 2003) (describing the negotiating process and the proposed Con-
vention). Other significant participants include Mexico, Norway, South Africa, and
Switzerland.
125. Currently, it appears that the EU and the United States may be headed toward an
impasse over audiovisual services within the WTO negotiations as well. See Lamy Pledges to
Protect Culture Rules, TECH EUR., Feb. 13, 2003, at V.3-4.
126. See Status of Implementation of Directive 95/46 on the Protection of Individuals
with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data (Nov. 7, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/
comm/internalmarket/en/dataprot/law/impl.htm.
127. Article 29-Data Prot. Working Party, Working Document on Determining the
International Application of EU Data Protection to Personal Data Processing on the Internet
by Non-EU Based Web Sites (May 30, 2002), at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-
market/en/dataprot/wpdocs/wp56_en.pdf.
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adopt one any time soon. Japan has been working on a national privacy
law for several years. Australia and Canada have national privacy laws,
but these differ from one another, and from the EU regime." Given these
different national approaches, an impasse may be unavoidable if coun-
tries insist on addressing data privacy in an agreement delimiting
national authority to regulate the Internet.
2 9
Taxation of the Internet already is a source of discord between the
United States and the EU, and the issue could become a stumbling block
during negotiations over an agreement delimiting national authority to
regulate the Internet. A primary objective of the EU's new E-VAT
Directive was to ensure that non-EU organizations selling electronically
to consumers within the EU would be required to collect VAT and remit
it to EU Member States. Even before the EU adopted the new Directive,
U.S. officials had issued statements criticizing elements of the plan and
objecting to the EU's decision to act unilaterally."0 The United States, by
contrast, has imposed a "moratorium" on certain taxes related to the
Internet through November 2003.' In light of these different
128. For an analysis of privacy laws in the EU, the United States, Japan, Canada, and
Australia, see Mark F. Kightlinger et al., International Privacy, in INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY
AND ELECTRONIC COMMERCE, supra note 28.
129. It would be ironic if the issue of data privacy blocked development of a broad
agreement delimiting national authority to regulate the Internet. There actually is a high de-
gree of consensus among developed nations about the basic principles that should govern
collection and use of personal information. These principles were articulated in the early
1980s by the OECD and the Council of Europe, and reaffirmed in the 1990s, most recently in
the EU-U.S. Safe Harbor Agreement. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Rec-
ommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and
Transborder Flows of Personal Data (Sept. 23, 1980), available at http://
www.OECD.orgfEN/document/O,,EN-document-43-nodirectorate-no-24-10255-29,00.html;
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal
Data of 28 January 1981, Europ. T.S. 108, available at http://conventions.coe.int/
treaty/EN/Treaties/HTML/108.htm; Safe Harbor Principles, 65 Fed. Reg. 45,666 (2000). The
text of the Safe Harbor Agreement can be found on the U.S. Department of Commerce web-
site. See Safe Harbor, at http://www.export.gov/safeharbor (last visited Jan. 13, 2003). The
remaining significant disagreements relate to how these principles should be enforced and
what limits an organization that accepts the principles should observe when transferring per-
sonal information to an organization that has not accepted the principles. As the Safe Harbor
Agreement demonstrates, it is possible to address these disagreements once the parties under-
stand the relevant national rules and the existing enforcement regimes.
130. Deputy Treasury Secretary Kenneth W. Dam, Statement on European Union E-
Commerce Tax Proposal (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
polOOl.htm.
131. See Pub. L. No. 107-75, 115 Stat. 703 (2001) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (statutory
note, § 1101)).
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approaches, participating countries could reach an impasse, if they
broach the problem of taxation in a new international agreement.1
32
Arguments about consumer protection in the online environment
also could undermine efforts to fashion a new international agreement.
Among other things, such disagreements have prevented participants in
the Hague Conference from reaching consensus on an international
agreement on jurisdiction.'33 Disagreements over consumer protection
also presented an important sticking point in the effort to move the E-
Commerce Directive through the European Parliament and the Council
of Ministers.1 4 In light of the debate within the EU, it seems unlikely
that the Member States will be disposed to adopt an approach in a
broader international setting that places tighter restrictions on their au-
thority to impose their consumer protection laws on the Internet. At the
same time, the United States seems likely to stick to its position in the
Hague Conference that companies should be expected to comply with
applicable laws in their home country. Given the depth of feeling on this
issue, an impasse may be difficult to avoid.'35
132. The OECD has made some progress in coordinating member country views on
taxation of e-commerce. See, e.g., OECD, ELECTRONIC COMMERCE: TAXATION CONDITIONS
FRAMEWORK (1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/MO00015000/M00015517.pdf. For
a more general description of OECD's work in this area, see About: Tax and Electronic Com-
merce, at http://www.oecd.org/EN/aboutlO,,EN-about- 101 -nodirectorate-no-no-no-29,00.html.
In light of the OECD's ongoing efforts, it may be advisable to leave the issue of taxation
within the OECD's portfolio.
133. The Hague Conference on Private International Law has been trying for several
years to draft an international convention on jurisdiction and recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments. Continuing disagreements about, among other things, jurisdiction over e-
commerce generally and business-to-consumer e-commerce in particular have prevented nego-
tiators from finalizing the proposed convention. See Peter D. Trooboff, The Hague
Conference, NAT'L L.J., July 23, 2001, at A19, available at http://www.cov.com/
publications/243.pd f.
134. European Commission officials ultimately brokered a compromise under which,
among other things, the Directive reaffirms the applicability of the existing corpus of Commu-
nity consumer protection laws, see supra note 64, excludes from the scope of the "country of
origin" rule national laws related to consumer contracts, see supra note 62 and accompanying
text, and includes consumer protection as a ground for triggering the override mechanism, see
supra note 65 and accompanying text.
135. Participating countries might avoid an impasse by building on the OECD's work on
consumer protection. The OECD issued non-binding Guidelines for Consumer Protection in
the Context of Electronic Commerce (OECD Guidelines) that embody an emerging interna-
tional consensus on how companies should do business online. OECD Directorate for Sci.,
Tech. & Indus. Comm. on Consumer Policy, Guidelines for Consumer Protection in the Con-
text of Electronic Commerce, C(99)184 final, available at http://www.oecd.org/pdf/
M00000000/M00000363.pdf. A new international agreement might require the OECD Guide-
lines to be incorporated appropriately in national consumer protection laws affecting the
Internet. Alternatively, companies hoping to benefit from the forbearance principle might be
required to commit to abide by the OECD Guidelines.
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C. A Formula for Compromise?
Section B identified several contentious issues that almost certainly
would demand attention during discussions about an international
agreement defining the limits on national authority to regulate the Inter-
net. This list is not intended to be exhaustive, and it seems likely that
other issues also would breed serious disagreement. One way to "solve"
this problem would be to take all contentious issues off the table by ex-
empting them from the proposed international agreement. Participants in
the Hague Conference currently are exploring this approach in an effort
to develop a less ambitious convention on recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments than the one originally envisaged.3 6 The disadvan-
tage of this approach is obvious: if every potentially contentious issue is
removed from the international agreement, the final product may be too
narrow to provide any real solution to the problem of conflicts in na-
tional authority to regulate the Internet. Disputes such as the Yahoo! case
will proliferate in all of the areas that the international agreement fails to
address. This result should hold little appeal for national governments or
the organizations that they regulate.
An alternative approach may be available if, as this Article has
recommended, the international agreement follows the basic model of
the E-Commerce Directive. The solution would be to draw up a list of
controversial areas and, instead of carving them out of the agreement
through exemptions, place as many of them as possible within the
framework of the override mechanism. Thus, for example, instead of
leaving a participating country entirely free to apply its privacy or
consumer protection legislation to website operators in other
participating countries, the agreement might require the participating
country to activate the override mechanism. The participating country
then would have to notify the relevant foreign government, and engage
in discussions about a possible solution based on the principle of home
country control. If talks proved fruitless, the participating country could
attempt to apply its law extraterritorially, and other participating
countries would be free to bring a challenge in the appropriate
international forum. Thus, an orderly procedure would replace the
current, relatively anarchic situation, and each participating country
136. See Andrea Schulz, Report on the First Meeting of the Informal Working Group on
the Judgments Project-Oct. 22-25, 2002, Hague Conference on Private International Law,
Preliminary Doc. No. 20 (Nov. 2002), ftp://ftp.hcch.net/doc/jdgm-pd20e.doc.
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would retain some freedom to take measures to protect citizens and
domestic businesses in appropriate circumstances. 137
Relying on the override mechanism rather than broad exemptions
would have a couple of additional benefits. First, it would recognize and
take advantage of the fact that national approaches to many of the more
contentious issues may be very similar, even if not identical. Similar le-
gal results often might be achieved under quite different regimes, if
enforcement authorities have an incentive to search for practical solu-
tions that preserve home country control over domestic website
operators. The override mechanism would give them such an incentive.
Of course, the EU did not follow this approach, but instead carved out
numerous exemptions from the E-Commerce Directive and the "country
of origin" rule. Many of the exemptions relate, however, to areas that
already are regulated by EC law, areas where free movement and some
form of home country control or mutual recognition previously had been
established. As noted earlier, the unusual thing about the E-Commerce
Directive is that it attempts to subject broad stretches of Member State
law to a "country of origin" rule without harmonizing the affected laws.
The override mechanism is designed to deal with controversies in areas
of lingering concern.
A second benefit of relying on the override mechanism rather than
broad exemptions is that the actual rate of compliance should be higher
under a system that promotes home country control. The point here is
quite simple: All other things being equal, U.S. companies such as
Yahoo! are more likely to comply with U.S. federal and state laws than
with French laws. French authorities will be better able to address
concerns raised by French citizens and companies, if French authorities
work with U.S. federal and state authorities to obtain robust enforcement
of U.S. federal and state laws. Thus, French citizens and companies
actually should benefit from an arrangement that channels controversial
issues into the override mechanism instead of carving them out for
unilateral action by the French government. This is not to say, of course,
that the override mechanism ultimately would resolve all disputes
amicably. The Yahoo! case may exemplify the type of situation in which
U.S. federal and state authorities could and would do relatively little to
137. Of the four stumbling blocks described in Section B of the text, taxation may be the
only one that would not fit neatly within the override mechanism. Tax policy on the Internet
will affect large numbers of business in many countries, and thus it would be difficult to deal
with applicable law disputes on a case-by-case basis. Thus, participating countries may wish
to exclude taxation from the proposed international agreement and instead focus their energy
on the OECD's efforts to develop internationally acceptable principles for Internet taxation.
See supra note 132.
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address the concerns of French citizens because of constitutional limits
and, perhaps, disagreements over issues of principle. Nevertheless, it is
possible that Yahoo! could have reached an accommodation with
domestic officials that it would not be willing to reach with a foreign
government. Even if the dispute ultimately proved intractable, Yahoo!,
the U.S. government, and the French government would not be in a
worse position for having tried to find a mutually agreeable solution than
the position they are in today.
D. Is an International Agreement Worth the Effort?
Given the difficulties that must be surmounted, is it worth attempting
to develop an international agreement defining the limits of national au-
thority to regulate the Internet? Clearly, in one sense, the answer to this
question depends upon the agreement. A bad agreement may be worse
than no agreement at all. Moreover, different stakeholders may have dif-
ferent criteria for what would constitute a "bad" agreement. For
example, the business community probably would object strongly to an
agreement that left each company subject to national laws in a wide
range of areas in all participating countries. By contrast, consumer
groups may object to an agreement that appears to strip consumers of
their right to rely on national consumer protection regimes. The best that
can be said in answer to these kinds of objections to an international
agreement is that they should be raised during the negotiating process.
They do not constitute objections to an agreement per se.
Of greater interest is the argument that an international agreement
defining the limits on national authority to regulate the Internet is unnec-
essary because the status quo-i.e. , the Yahoo! case-reflects a sensible
response to conflicting claims of jurisdiction to prescribe.'38 Although
this argument takes different forms, it typically begins with the premise
that the Yahoo! case really is nothing new or particularly shocking. "9
Indeed, the argument goes, the Yahoo! case actually reaches a sensible
result because it allows France to try to apply its laws to limit the pur-
portedly harmful effects within France of a U.S.-based Internet service.
At the same time, under Yahoo! the U.S. courts will protect the U.S. ser-
vice from any overreaching by the French within the United States.
Moreover, the "system" is particularly well-suited to protect smaller U.S.
online services because such services are essentially judgment proof
138. For an example of this line of argument, see Goldsmith, supra note 3; see also
Reimann, supra note 1, at 669 n.24.
139. Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 264 (stating "[o]n the surface, the Yahoo case is a
mundane exercise in the analysis of territorial sovereignty and personal jurisdiction").
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within France.'40 Thus, even if they are found by French courts to have
violated French law or harmed French citizens, they can remain safe
within U.S. borders and escape the reach of the French. An international
agreement almost certainly would ruin this relatively cozy arrangement,
by conceding to the French (and all other participating countries) some
authority to impose their national laws on service providers located
abroad. 4'
Responding fully to this argument would require a much longer
Article. There are, however, several points that should be made. First, the
issue is not whether the Yahoo! case is new or shocking, but whether the
Yahoo! case represents the tip of an iceberg. Although cases such as
Yahoo! did arise before the advent of the Internet without necessitating a
new international agreement, these sorts of cases may proliferate as
cross-border e-commerce expands.' Indeed, each of the stumbling block
issues mentioned above is a potential flashpoint for conflicts between
national regimes. What used to be a trickle of cases affecting relatively
140. See Goldsmith, supra note 3; Reimann, supra note 1, at 669 n.24. Swire has sug-
gested that national efforts to regulate the Internet will succeed against large, highly visible
international organizations ("elephants") but not against small, more mobile players ("mice").
Peter P. Swire, Of Elephants, Mice, and Privacy: International Choice of Law and the Inter-
net, 32 INT'L LAW. 991, 1019-24 (1998). For a general discussion of the difficulties associated
with enforcing judgments against website operators established in foreign countries, see
Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Will the Judgment-Proof Own Cyberspace?, 32 INT'L LAW. 1121, 1131-
48(1998).
141. A more radical line of argument would attack both the status quo (the Yahoo! case)
and my proposal for an international agreement, supporting instead a more anarchic environ-
ment in which nation states do not attempt to impose their domestic laws on the Internet.
Johnson and Post are the best-known exponents of this position. See Johnson & Post, supra
note 3; Goldsmith, supra note 3, at 1199 n.3 (citing a string of articles by Johnson and Post
pursuing this theme); Shamoil Shipchandler, Note, The Wild Wild Web: Non-Regulation as the
Answer to the Regulatory Question, 33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 435, 458-62 (2000) (arguing for
"non-regulation as the solution"). Lessig and Goldsmith, among others, have criticized the
Johnson and Post position. Lessig, supra note 3; Goldsmith, supra note 3. Although the anar-
chist view is interesting, I do not respond to it here because, as a practical matter, it almost
certainly will not prevail. As the Yahoo! case shows, some countries will attempt to apply
domestic laws to the Internet, including online services based in other countries. The real
question is not whether we can persuade them to refrain from doing so (we cannot), but
whether it is worth persuading them to enter into an international agreement that will force
them to do so in a relatively sensible and predictable manner.
142. See, e.g., Reidenberg, supra note 3, at 269-71 (describing cases in which U.S. state
and federal courts have applied domestic laws to foreign website operators); Patrick G. Crago,
Note, Fundamental Rights on the Infobahn: Regulating the Delivery of Internet Related Ser-
vices Within the European Union, 20 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 467, 484-85 (1997)
(describing Germany's efforts to enforce compliance with anti-Nazi legislation by foreign
online services). The European Commission clearly was convinced that disputes among EU
Member States over whose law applies to the Internet would be common enough and costly
enough to warrant adoption of the E-Commerce Directive as a preventive measure. See Pro-
posed E-Commerce Directive, supra note 48, at 7-10.
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few people and businesses could become a flood. An international
agreement might serve as a levy to prevent or at least channel the flood.
Of course, if such cases remain relatively uncommon, an international
agreement might not be worth the effort.
Second, all other things being equal, companies large and small gen-
erally prefer predictable legal environments to unpredictable
environments. The current legal environment is extremely- unpredictable
because it is anarchic. Any international agreement worth negotiating
should reduce considerably the unpredictability of the environment by
establishing guidelines in many areas where, currently, no guidelines exist.
This is not to suggest that everyone would be happy with the guidelines.
Indeed, each guideline is likely to make some stakeholders happier than
others. But at least all stakeholders would know what the guidelines are,
and they would be able to adapt their behavior accordingly.
Third, although the status quo may provide some comfort for large
multinational companies such as Yahoo! by protecting their assets in
their home countries, it essentially abandons them to the tender mercies
of foreign governments insofar as those companies maintain assets
abroad.'43 An international agreement that imposed some restrictions on
foreign governments should represent a step forward from the standpoint
of a large multinational company. This would be true even if the agree-
ment did not entirely tie the hands of the foreign government, but simply
defined the areas in which the foreign government would and would not
be allowed to impose its laws on a multinational. Yahoo! might prefer an
arrangement that left it subject to a clearly defined 10 percent of French
law over the status quo, which leaves it subject-at least potentially-to
100 percent of French law.'"
Fourth, and last, the defense of the status quo outlined above seems
to presume that smaller online companies operating across borders via
the Internet are willing to be scofflaws in foreign countries as long as
they can remain safely hidden within their own borders. In the author's
experience, most organizations wish to obey the law, and they will be
very troubled by an arrangement in which a company, or its officials, can
be "safely" convicted of a civil or criminal offense within France be-
cause the company has no assets within France. Moreover, U.S. lawyers
143. Reidenberg identifies some of the assets that Yahoo! maintains in France that a
French court might have attacked in order to enforce its judgment. Reidenberg, supra note 3,
at 269.
144. The calculation might change if the international agreement also dealt with en-
forcement of judgments. Yahoo! might not support an arrangement under which it would be
subject to 10 percent of French law, if all French judgments within that 10 percent were fully
enforceable in the United States.
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generally are forbidden by the rules of professional conduct from advis-
ing a client to violate the law. 45 Thus, company counsel, both inside and
outside, should resist any defense of the status quo that rests on a notion
of "safe" unlawful conduct abroad. An international agreement could
identify the areas where participating governments may regulate if they
choose, and thus assist companies to determine in what areas they may
have to modify their behavior to obey applicable foreign laws. Of course,
even with an international agreement in place, some online companies
may ignore the laws in foreign countries, and other online companies
may implement technical measures to pull out of particular countries
rather than obey the laws. In both situations, however, the international
agreement would clarify the legal environment within which the com-
pany must formulate its plan of action.
In sum, the status quo does not represent a particularly appealing ar-
rangement from the standpoint of large or small online companies. A
well-crafted international agreement that increases the predictability of
the legal environment should represent a step forward.
145. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(d) (2002); DC RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT 1.2(e) (2002).
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